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ABSTRACT
Most national and international legislative instruments impose a duty to conduct appropriate
due diligence when doing business, in order to hold each company accountable for the
malicious activities of its partners. This project’s main argument is that formal due diligence
is not enough when it comes to preventing corrupt business behavior, particularly when
dealing with highly corrupt environments. Starting with an analysis of the Italian legislative
efforts, this project demonstrates how the promotion of corporate intelligence into standard
business practice could fill the gaps left by due diligence. Emphasis is placed upon the
adoption of corporate intelligence among SMEs, given their being the proven stabilizers of
society. This project presents a number of recommendations to the Italian government, the
law enforcement agencies and corporate intelligence firms of how to promote corporate
intelligence and, therefore, security in the Middle East.
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1. Introduction
This research proposes a different approach to the securitization of the Middle East. Starting
from the idea that corrupt business practices negatively affect international security and
national stability, a series of recommendations are made in order to improve anti-corruption
efforts. While most doctrines focus on the development of national infrastructures to do so,
this research is based on the idea that changes made in the legal framework of a country, such
as Italy, may have positive repercussions on the way business is conducted abroad – namely
in the Middle East.
The conceptual arguments are based on the idea that each government makes a choice
on how to capitalize from corrupt business practices: it may choose to be the beneficiary of
the revenues of corruption, or to cash in from the fines imposed on those who are corrupt.
The latter case is that of Western or westernized systems, where anti-corrupt practices see
their strongest development and enforcement. These provisions diversely require companies
to carry out a number of checks before doing business with another company; they also hold
the companies liable for any wrongdoing of a business partner, whom they have not properly
investigated. The starting point for the research is an analysis of how the current control
practices, the so-called due diligence, may satisfy the requirements of the law whilst still not
fully satisfying the needs of businesses.
This study unifies the expertise of professionals in the field of corporate
investigations, with the on-field experience of the researcher with Kroll, a leading corporate
intelligence company, in order to understand the obstacles that businesses encounter in the
current legal system, and what changes should be made at the government, law enforcement
and corporate intelligence company level. This research corroborates these findings with
established scholarly work, as well as practitioners’ manuals and publications. The research
does not only define the difference between corporate intelligence and due diligence – a
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theme that today appears almost untouched – but it also shows, where possible, how the
acknowledgment of an enhanced set of controls in the public and the private sectors could
benefit both. The fundamental constant is the cooperation between these sectors, which
currently appears, all too often, to demonstrate an antagonist relationship, going as far as
rivalry in some cases.
The argument is divided in three sections: the first aims to give an overview of the
current state of the regulations in two countries. Italy is chosen as an example of a country
with a Western approach to corrupt practices. It is also facing an economic downfall, and
could benefit from a strengthening of its revenue streams; therefore it also has an interest to
strengthen its enforcement of the rule of law concerning corrupt practices. The United Arab
Emirates (UAE) is chosen as an example of a Westernized approach to corrupt practices. It is
also currently recovering from a period of economic crisis. Both countries have something to
learn from each other; the policy recommendations made for Italy could be taken into
consideration by the UAE in the development of its future regulations. In this section, how
the current regulations establish a set of fixed checks to be performed as a checklist exercise
is explained.
The second section is a case study: the example chosen is the long-standing ties
between the Italian mafia and the traffic of toxic waste to Somalia, in exchange of weapons
for local extremist groups. With this example it is possible to understand the weakness of the
due diligence assessments required by the law, concretely, especially in the case of criminal
events that were officially unreported but were unofficially exposed. Moreover, the link
between corporate investigations and international security is reinforced.
The third section finally shows the benefits of corporate intelligence assessment. The
idea of flexibility in checks is introduced to explain how a company should make an
assessment and when to use this tool, also in consideration of its costly nature. The means of
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investigation that characterize corporate intelligence are also shown, namely the use of public
records, the media, human intelligence and technological platforms, along with their
limitations. With this analysis, the research underlines the obstacles to the diffusion of this
tool, but also argues how its effectiveness can be improved when its use is included in the
company’s code of conduct.
In conclusion:
(i)

The Italian legislator is prompted to:
a.

Enhance the provisions against accounting fraud;

b.

Diversify the sanctions’ spectrum;

c.

Incentivize the disclosure of corrupt practices;

d.

Incentivize the use of corporate intelligence;

(ii)

Law enforcement agencies are prompted to:
a.

(iii)

Establish formal relationships with corporate intelligence companies.
Corporate intelligence companies are prompted to:

a.

Embed in-house data analytics tools;

b.

Invest in the development of SME-specific products.

2. Client
Kroll has been operating in the field of corporate investigations and risk consulting since
Jules B. Kroll established it, in 1972, in New York City. To date, it boasts 52 offices
positioned both in the developed and emerging markets of 29 countries. It has operated in
every geographic region, servicing both governments and businesses. Kroll has more than
2.800 employees, all with have extremely diverse backgrounds; ranging from accounting to
forensic investigations, to strategic consulting and information technology, political science,
law and economics.
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During the merger-mania of the Seventies, Kroll pioneered investigative due
diligence. When the Western markets slowed down at the beginning of the nineties, and those
regimes started falling apart, Kroll retained its worldwide recognition through success in high
profile assignments such as the uncovering of the assets hidden by Ferdinand Marcos, JeanClaude Duvalier and Saddam Hussein, the negotiation of kidnapping cases in Brazil and the
security revamping at the World Trade Center after the 1993 terrorist attack. More recently,
Kroll has focused its efforts on growing its business as a technology-based intelligence
company. Today its diversified business is focused on investigations, cyber security, due
diligence, compliance, security risk management, data recovery and e-discovery.
In the last five years, Kroll has focused on the promotion of its corporate intelligence
sector. The company offers transaction intelligence, compliance consulting and investigative
services, for commercial value and litigation support, during different phases of the business
life cycle of its clients. Its clients include major global corporations, law firms, government
institutions and equity houses. Kroll’s unique feature is its level of access to sources; on one
hand, it draws publicly available information from a comprehensive set of proprietary
databases and on the other, it relies on a network of external investigation specialists to gain
insights on specific industries or geographies, collecting information locally and receiving
feedback on the field.
Its products are delivered through four practice areas:
(i)

Investigation and disputes (I&D) – depending on the region of interest, Kroll offers
a wide range of investigative services, which may range from reputational
intelligence to market entry and transaction intelligence, as well as litigation
advisory and financial investigations. Lately, Kroll has been pushing its cyber
intelligence products, thanks to the cooperation with its sister company Kroll
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Ontrack, which provides cyber security consulting services and other Information
Technology (IT) services.
(ii)

Compliance – the company offers consulting and guidance on anti-bribery and
anti-money laundering regulations, also providing its clients with related services
such as vendor screening and third party risk assessments;

(iii)

Information security – thanks again to the cooperation between Kroll and Kroll
Ontrack, the company offers information assurance and IT security compliance
services, as well as data breach response and resolution; while Kroll Ontrack deals
with the technical side, Kroll takes care of the human intelligence aspect of the
breaches;

(iv)

Physical security – particularly in the United States, and less overseas, Kroll
provides threat assessment services, as well as security engineering services and
guidance during the development of security policies and procedures.

Kroll’s Milan office holds much history and experience relevant to on-field investigations,
mainly focused on gathering business intelligence and uncovering corruption in, and for, the
Italian Public Administration. Kroll’s business has grown exponentially during the economic
crisis that hit the country in 2007, because of a higher risk of fraud at a time when companies
could not afford it. The Milan office is headed by Marianna Vintiadis, Kroll’s country
manager in Italy who is also responsible for operations in Austria and Greece, as well as
Spain and part of the Balkans.
Kroll’s Dubai office quickly gained high profile assignments that made it a hub of
investigative consulting services in the Middle East, despite only having been registered in
the federal financial free zone of the Dubai International Financial Center only since 2007.
The Dubai office is specialized in investigative business intelligence consulting; it informs
those clients willing to embark on investments in emerging markets or challenging
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environments about commercial, regulatory and reputational risks. Yaser Dajani is the
managing director and head of the firm’s Middle Eastern operations. Both the Milan and the
Dubai office report to the Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) coordination office,
which is based in London. The Europe, Middle East and Africa managing director of the
investigation and disputes branch is Tom Everett-Heath, while Kevin Braine is the EMEA
managing director of compliance.

3. Background
3.1.

Fighting corruption to promote security

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Ronald Noble, at that time Interpol’s
Secretary General, underlined how “the most sophisticated security systems, the best
structures, or trained and dedicated security personnel are useless, if they are undermined
from the inside by a single act of corruption”. He proposed investing in people before
intelligence infrastructures (Noble, 2001, p. 1). The fight against terrorism, insecurity and
conflict in general is clearly double-threaded to the fight against corruption. However, the
infinite complexity of corruption as an “artifact of social and political organization”
(Warburton, 2001, p. 221) makes it difficult to tackle through the traditional system alone,
and its two-sided nature makes it even more difficult to detect.
Corrupt business practices may be approached as either an economic concern or a
values issue. The former approach covers the debate with a veil of technicality, trying to
make a calculation of the benefits over the costs of such behaviors (Bayar, 2009). On the
other hand, when approaching the topic as a matter of values – the so-called ‘business ethics’
– the debate is often overshadowed by other priorities; the introduction of a set of business
values into a given system is postponed until other security issues are overcome, as they
appear more urgent (Chayes, Carson, Mangan, & Lopez, 2014).
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However, scholars (Forrer, Fort, & Gilpin, 2012) have linked higher levels of
perceived corruption, as included in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index, to higher levels of violence and instability.

They foresee a trend of growing

importance of the private sector in influencing public security policies. There is a need to reassess the elements of instability and to understand that corrupt business practices are a
security concern. Part of the modern conflict management doctrine debates that corruption
can be a stability factor in challenging environments, since it splits the pie among the
competing elite. However, those who are not members of the elite become the victims of the
corrupt system and, going to the farthest extreme, are those who will join an insurgency or
legitimize a coup. Sixty-five percent of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region ranking low on business ethics, and in the lower half in the scores regarding
the ease of doing business, also rank medium to low in the United Nations Human
Development Index (Bishara, 2011, p. 229).
Putting corruption indexes and violence indexes side-to-side shows that their
relationship is tight; a recent study by Prof. Sarah Chayes of the Carnegie Endowment of
International Peace did exactly this. She showed how “twelve of the fifteen lowest-ranking
countries on Transparency International’s 2013 CPI are the scene of insurgencies, harbor
extremist groups or pose other grave threats to international security” (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2014, p. 11). However, the CPI cannot be seen as an authoritative
analytical tool, and it was never meant to be such.
Because of the harsh social environment created by systemic corruption, those who
are not elite members struggle. For this reason the first actors in the market to be affected by
corrupt practices are family businesses and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Paradoxically it is them who are those reportedly crucial to the stabilization of societal
dynamics, as they are the true originators of diffused welfare especially in the developing
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markets. It will be seen how these are also the business sectors where it is harder to
implement control schemes and sound anti-corruption empowerment policies.
Both belligerence and corruption have a spillover effect, and their combination acts as
an instability multiplier. Das and DiRienzo, as well as others, analyzed how the spatial decay
of corruption in the Middle East is even larger than that of instability, as it reaches 4.400 km
(Das & DiRienzo, 2012, p. 512). The paper will argue that it is imperative that the fight
against corruption, and therefore the promotion of stability and security, must happen
globally and regionally at first. Single nation-wide regulations can be a great tool for this
purpose thanks to their international scope of action, as already shown by the United States’
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The common belief is that the solution lies within a
democratic governance, since its checks-and-balances allow the defeat of the protectionist
tactics employed by the power-holders. Under this idea, Western policy makers expect
Middle Eastern authoritarian governments not to regulate the use of corrupt business
practices. Contrarily, business laws make it possible to leverage greater revenues against
cleaner business relationships, regardless of the governance model.

3.2.

The choice of revenue streams

The presence of corrupt practices in public-to-private and private-to-private relationships is
often perceived as a failure of the system. It is perceived as a product of grievances, as a way
to build unofficial ties and to secure business where the economy is insecure. For this reason,
the phenomenon is contrasted by the civil society alone, that tackles the small scale technical
deficiencies of the public administration through capacity building programs (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2014, p. 10).
In the Middle East, an average of six percent of a company’s revenues is lost in
bribes, and this amount can rocket up to twenty-five percent in some more challenging
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political environments (Bishara, 2011, p. 227). The criminalization of corruption in the mind
of the public has shadowed its nature; in some markets’ dynamics corruption does not work
against the system but is the system. Choosing corruption means choosing a precise revenue
stream, in the same way as cashing in fines obtained as a consequence of the enforcement of
anti-corruption regulations. The authoritarian elites of the Middle East oppose anti-corruption
schemes because these would lead to changes in the society’s control structure that would
threaten the persistence of their power. Corporations and SMEs that engage with emerging
markets may feel that systemic corruption is cultural, and its cost is a necessity to be taken
into account when dealing with local governments or companies. This research argues that
the engagement in corrupt practices does not depend directly on culture or history, but on a
rational choice of revenues and societal dynamics for power stabilization. At the same time, it
should be understood that contrasting corruption is an arbitrary choice of revenue streams
itself.
The private sector sits in the middle of this contrasting environment, especially
companies that are trying to expand into emerging markets. On one hand, they face the
threats coming from the regulatory requirements that, if they are not met, can lead to massive
fines and reputational downfalls. This can raise the costs needed to shelter operations from
practices that may be considered negatively, thus creating even more challenges to the
already delicate operations overseas. On the other hand, companies are required to engage in
corrupt practices in order to keep afloat in a market where this is the norm.

3.3.

The growing importance of corporate governance codes

The threat that corrupt practices pose to the corporate environment is changing over time,
both qualitatively and quantitatively. In 2012, a survey carried out by Deloitte, sixty-two
percent of the executives interviewed “were not very confident in the ability of their company
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to manage compliance and integrity related risks” (Deloitte, 2012, p. 4). In 2015, Kroll
reported in its Global Fraud Report that fraud from within the organization is the most
worrying, as it affected four in five surveyed companies (Kroll, 2015, p. 9), even if the level
of confidence reported by Deloitte three years before grew to sixty percent. As the private
sector’s awareness grows, diverse sector-specific approaches develop answers to these
threats, protecting companies and securing their investments. Regulations struggle to keep up
with this fast-paced evolution of threats, and the civil society works to fill the gaps.
Parallel to law-grade instruments to fight corruption, a large number of soft
instruments have been provided by international organizations, governmental agencies and
the civil society. In particular, the management doctrine has well established the role of
corporate governance in combating corrupt practices. Notwithstanding this, in an interview,
Yaser Dajani of Kroll underlined how Middle Eastern companies perceive Western
regulations as an imposition, or don’t consider them at all. Thankfully, a thorough analysis of
the doctrine regarding corporate governance best practices reveals that the debate is finally
focused on how to serve individual companies’ interests, rather than merely transferring
international standards to local business structures (Boubaker & Nguyen, 2014, p. 550). The
issue with the previous approach was that the creation of one globalized index to evaluate
corporate governance and benchmark the features of companies with such international index
(transcending, however, the local economic culture and structure) appeared fair for
multinational corporations, but actually impacted SMEs negatively, as these standards did not
appear scalable (Bishara, 2011, p. 244). As previously mentioned, in the MENA region,
especially, SMEs are the core of economy. For this reason, the international community, and
governmental organizations in particular, have increasingly developed guidelines to promote
and influence the creation of corporate governance codes, but with a cultural-relative tone.
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The question on how to develop corporate governance in the Middle East has been
posed recently. The original input has come from Egypt and Oman, who developed the first
codes in the early 2000s (Koldertsova (Amico), 2011). Some scholars, however, notice that
this development has halted since the Arab Spring, due to the generalized feeling of doubt
that it instilled in the population, which has “resulted in a profound questioning of the
economic and social pact” (Boubaker & Nguyen, 2014, p. 547). It should be positively
noted, however, that to date the debate is very much alive, and Yemen is the only country in
the region that lacks a securities regulator (Boubaker & Nguyen, 2014, p. 549). At the same
time, while economic crime has globally increased, the Middle East has experienced a
decrease of seven percent since 2011, as reported by the firm Pricewaterhouse-Coopers in
2014 (Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, 2014a).
A focus on the UAE shows that, even if the government integrated anti-corruption
provisions in the Federal Penal Code as early as in the 1980s, the true enforcement of such
norms has only become tangible since the financial crisis hit emerging markets in 2008.
Unfortunately, the case of the UAE is that of the implementation of international standards of
practice, imported as-is. The dichotomy between these imported ideas is not paired with the
needs and traditions of the society (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 25), and the institutional
framework still relies on elitarian mechanisms.

3.4.

The shift in the burden of investigations

Anti-corrupt practices legislations, with the FCPA in the lead, have enacted a shift of
responsibility in the investigation of business partners. This new regulatory environment has
empowered the compliance department of companies with a new responsibility: companies
are now tasked with controlling the activities of their subsidiaries and third parties, and they
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are considered directly responsible for any wrongdoing. The FCPA, which has been around
since 1977, has seen a boost in its application since 2001 and the rise of the war on terrorism.
Today corporations with operations abroad are required to evaluate the risk of each
activity and, depending on the likelihood of involvement in corrupt practices, they must
proceed to an assessment of each risk with proportional due diligence. While this principle
of flexible risk assessment allows for better resource allocation, it also creates a glass ceiling
over the expansion of SMEs to emerging markets, as they often cannot afford the costs of the
required enhanced due diligence associated with a higher corruption risk. At the same time,
the steep fines that come with non-compliance create reasonable fear. On top of this, the
reputational downfall that comes with corrupt practices does not make it worthy to expand.
Companies that can afford to engage in these costs often divide their due diligence
into two parts:
(i)

Everyday due diligence is taken care of by in-house compliance experts, who rely
more on off-the-shelf database-based products, or who make use of IT specialists
for business analytics, in order to be able to carry out due diligence over huge
amounts of subjects at minimum cost;

(ii)

The assessment of high risk profiles is outsourced to external corporate
investigation companies, as they offer tailored solutions for the assessment of
internal or external threats, relying on their global network of sources and in-house
intelligence specialists, accountants, former law enforcement agents, lawyers,
journalists and business consultants.
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4. Literature review
4.1.

The security-business link

Chayes established a link between systematic corruption and international security (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2014): she argues that it is a primary role of States to
influence one another through the use of anticorruption regulations, in order to drive all
countries towards a unified approach to the issue. She corroborates her statements saying that
countries make a choice as to which revenue streams to benefit from, and anticorruption
regulations are meant to influence these streams.
However, most doctrines link corruption to security, as it is the instrument for
criminal organizations financing. Thachuk, focuses on combating corruption in order to curb
terrorism financing; her ideal scope of intervention is the public sector (Thachuk, 2005).
Others understand corruption in their structure of criminal networks (Cartier–Bresson, 1997;
McIllwain, 1999), but there is a more recent trend to analyze these networks outside of the
strict framework of corruption, through quantitative tools such as social network analysis
(Kirchner & Gade, 2011). However, corruption is usually understood as a social process and,
especially in the Middle East, it appears justified by a cultural relativist approach (Situngkir,
2004; Warburton, 2001). Chayes strongly opposes this trend.
The role of the private sector in promoting security is fairly new to academia, but it
has quickly gained exposure in professional publications and practitioner-oriented guidelines.
Most of the publications have been drafted by civil society (Transparency International,
2009; United Nations, 2005), in the attempt to trigger ethical behavior especially in those
companies involved in emerging markets.. A sub-set of publications deals with the issues
faced by companies’ involvement in procurement as part of international missions where they
are particularly exposed to corruption (Transparency International UK, 2014b).
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A different approach is taken by those scholars who envisage the presence of a
corporate foreign policy (Fort & Fort, 2015; Forrer et al., 2012; Fort & Schipani, 2004). Their
idea is that businesses are in a strong position to promote peace and security - namely
through their engagement in peace making, peace keeping, and peace building - because of
their influential role in economics. They also underline the interest of these companies to
flourish, which can only happen in peaceful economies. This can be seen as a counterargument to the ethical behavior doctrines (Bishara, 2011; Colondres & Petry, 2014).

4.2.

Anti-corrupt practices regulations

The constant, as examined by Graycar’s leading doctrine, is that corrupt practices bring
“capacity loss” for the public sector, while benefiting only the private side (Graycar & Villa,
2011, p. 434). This nature of ‘bad governance’ makes it necessary for the public sector to
tackle this issue both with legislative and policy instruments.
The regulatory review is operated in three completely different ways by scholars and
professionals, which, however, complete one another:
(i) The legal approach analyzes the current regulations in order to make
recommendations, either on their application, or on their future development. This literature
is divided into three fronts: [a] the largest deals with the issues of the United States Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, always showing how its enforcement has grown in the past years, but
either underlining its downfalls making recommendations for specific revisions (Barker,
Pacini, & Sinason, 2012; Yockey, 2011; Deming, 2006; Cascini & Vanasco, 1992), or giving
insights to businesses on how to comply with the law in a cheaper fashion, seeing compliance
as risk management (Cassin, 2014; Park, 2012; Bishara, 2011; Biegelman & Biegelman,
2010); [b] the second front deals with the current state of the regulations globally, mostly
reviewing and comparing the differences without making further comments (Prieß, 2014;
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World Economic Forum, 2014; Baker&McKenzie, 2014), or lightly remarking the need for
further development issuing recommendations; [c] the third front analyzes the existing
regulations in the Middle East, and in the UAE specifically (Bellin, 2012; Gillespie, 1987;
Hassaan, 2013; Koldertsova (Amico), 2011; Wold, 2011). A few scholars, such as Eicher,
also link the legal heterogeneity of anticorruption regulations to business cultural differences
(Eicher, 2009).
(ii) From a business point of view, the focus is on either the extrinsic impact of
regulations on companies’ practices, or on the intrinsic issues that companies face when
complying with different regulations. Both approaches are pursued mainly by practitioneroriented publications. [a] The former ‘extrinsic’ approach tackles the regulatory issues that
companies may face when expanding abroad, with a focus on the Gulf (Gaeta, 2012;
Loughman & Sibery, 2012), while most professional publications tackle specific issues such
as risk disclosure levels (Kamal Hassan, 2009) or credit risk management (Masood, Al
Suwaidi, & Darshini Pun Thapa, 2012) to advise perspective clients on the regulatory risks of
Middle Eastern markets. [b] The ‘intrinsic’ approach, conversely, aims at describing the
elements of a company that are fundamentally necessary to face emerging markets’ risks, and
advocates a necessary innovation of corporate governance structures (Boubaker & Nguyen,
2014; Hassan Al‐Tamimi, 2012; Adawi & Rwegasira, 2011).
(iii) The civil society, and the scholars that advocate for its involvement in the
anticorruption action, focus on the importance of innovation in public policies in order to
involve businesses in the control process (Does de Willebois & World Bank, 2011; ILO
Regional Office for the Arab States & UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2013;
Transparency International, 2009), as well as massive “name and shame campaigns”
(Thachuk, 2005, p. 151).
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4.3.

The role and evolution of corporate controls

Most risk management firms periodically issue surveys about current risks arising from
fraud; some of them focus on a global overview of risks (Kroll, 2014, 2015); others divide
these risks by geographic region (Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c); a
minority surveyed clients in order to gain insights into the best practices used to manage
these risks (Control Risks, 2011; Protiviti, 2014).
The shortcomings of current due diligence procedures are tackled in two different
ways:
(i)

most scholars elaborate new ways to improve the due diligence process (Butcher &
Bernstein, 2007; Gleich, Kierans, & Hasselbach, 2010; Ramón-Llorens &
Hernández-Cánovas, 2012; Volkov, 2015; Volkov & Weiss, 2015), and advocate
for the implementation of this step into the standards of practice, underlining how
still there is a lack of proper controls by the private sector;

(ii)

(ii) others criticize the current state of the art, and propose to go “beyond
checklists” and to embrace tailored corporate intelligence procedures (Yong,
2013).

The actors of due diligence are also understood differently: (i) auditors have traditionally
been seen as the gatekeepers of the company (Halbouni, 2015; Hanim Fadzil, Haron, &
Jantan, 2005), while (ii) there is a growing trend towards recognizing the role of corporate
investigation companies and their expertise (Coburn, 2006; Schneider, 2006). A completely
different stance is taken by those scholars who intend to promote whistleblowing practices
(Hunton & Rose, 2011; Tudu & Pathak, 2014); here, the protagonist is the whistleblower and
the investigations that follow his or her declarations come after.
The methodology of corporate controls is rarely broken down into steps, and almost
all the publications suggest guiding principles but advocate for tailored solutions. However,

	
  

16	
  

	
  

publications that discuss investigation methodologies usually focus on one specific tool to
prove or disprove its effectiveness. The trending instruments are social network analysis
(Kirchner & Gade, 2011), predictive techniques (Baesens, 2015), the implementation of
confidential reporting channels (Johansson & Carey, 2015) and other organizational
behavioral analysis procedures. Access to information is always regarded as the first step in a
control program. Transparency International has issued a review of current legislation across
15 countries regarding classified information, in which it exposes a number of issues
regarding information availability for those corporations involved in defense contracts
(Transparency International UK, 2014a).

4.4.

Summary

The literature exposes two recently established nexuses: scholars have linked international
security with anticorruption regulation, and professionals have recognized the role of
corporate controls in strengthening their market positioning. Following these established
links, it is possible to further develop theories about how one country can make use of its
anticorruption regulations to promote ethical business behavior in another country, therefore
strengthening – or building - the state of security of the latter.

5. Methodology
Different methodologies have been used for this kind of research in the past, and each one
had a different purpose. Qualitative approaches are not necessarily the predominant type,
since business topics are usually tackled by economics and management scholars. For this
reason quantitative studies suit their benchmarking ends well. However, by focusing on the
use of qualitative paradigms, researchers have made use of interviews, case studies or
sociological assessments tied to geography. These three instruments function well to assess
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the motivations and propagation patterns of corruption, as well as to study the effectiveness
of different regulatory frameworks.
As per Creswell’s leading doctrine “a qualitative study is defined as an inquiry
process of understanding a social or human problem, based on building a complex, holistic
picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and conducted in a
natural setting” (Creswell, 1998, p. 15) Such methodology appears effective and coherent
with the purpose of this research. Specifically, when trying to establish an influential
connection between self-established phenomena such as securitization and corporate
investigations, it appears useful to retain a holistic approach. Their individual complexity,
their legal implications, their social impact and the reason behind their pros and cons can
only be reflected well through a multi-focal analysis. Conversely, the qualitative
methodology, as described by Creswell, involves an immersion of the researcher in the
natural setting of the phenomenon. For this reason, the research envisages the direct
participation of the researcher in the activities of the research client.
The choice of the tools used for this research has been made on the basis of the
researcher’s competencies and on the expected validity of the information obtained. The
research has been conducted making use of three instruments:
(i)

Interviews with selected experts;

(ii)

Field experience with the client;

(iii)

Professional-oriented literature and pre-conducted surveys collection.

A case study has been included to show the repercussions of the current policies in place.
However, the case study cannot be considered a research tool since it was used to reinforce
and clarify the argument, and it was not a product of the research data itself.
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5.1.

Interviews

Interviews were conducted and had four objectives:
(i)

To explore the role of the regulatory framework in influencing corporations’
behavior;

(ii)

To explore the best practices of corporate intelligence from a number of leading
firms;

(iii)

To examine the pros and cons of increased private companies participation in anticorruption enforcement efforts;

(iv)

To foresee the public policy developments related to the activities of risk
management consultancies.

The set of questions for each interview changed depending on the area of expertise of the
interviewee and on the specific issue that was to be examined in depth. The interviewees are
divided into three categories:
(i)

Corporate intelligence professionals – both experts in management positions and
staff level were interviewed in order to build an informal investigations’ workflow
of their experience in an effort to learn about the best practices from professionals
from leading consulting companies;

(ii)

Risk management professionals – professionals with peculiar expertise in the
assessment of risks were interviewed. Their contributions appeared particularly
valuable in order to understand how the market of compliance is drifting, and the
power of public records. Moreover, great insights were provided on the
implementation of regulatory frameworks in the Middle East and in Europe;

(iii)

Law enforcement professionals – prevalently former members of law enforcement
agencies with expertise in the field of white-collar crimes were interviewed. While
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general contacts in this sector were often turned down, it was possible to secure
truthful insights when a higher degree of confidentiality was ensured.

5.2.

Fieldwork

The leading method of research to address the research question was fieldwork experience.
The researcher was immersed in the experience of a financial analyst for the client, Kroll, a
leading corporate investigations company, and worked on a number of real-life cases.
The fieldwork experience lasted for three months. The first and the third months were
spent at the Milan office, and the second one in Dubai. The researcher reported directly to the
country managers for the entire duration of the experience. The type of work carried out
included due diligence assignments and asset tracing preliminary assessments. The
experience gave an understanding of the needs of the clients, of the volatility of the market
and the need for tailored solutions. A comparison between the two environments gave
incomparable insights into the different approaches of the two offices, and of the different
requests made by clients. Working side by side with Kroll allowed an understanding of
existing gaps in the regulatory framework, of the limitations of the systems and of the
practical necessities of corporate investigation firms. Additionally, day-to-day activities
allowed insights from staff members to be gained, on which most of the recommendations
laid out in the conclusion have been shaped.

5.3.

Pre-conducted surveys

Each year Kroll publishes a number of reports concerning the issues of corporate
investigations, giving particularly detailed insights into anti-bribery and corruption policies
and their implementation. Since the research aims at not only describing the informal
investigation methodologies for compliance, but also at analyzing the gaps in the compliance
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policies of a company that leave it vulnerable to malicious behaviors, this appears to be a
good opportunity to gain insights whilst leaving the companies anonymous to the researcher
himself. The benefits of pre-conducted survey analysis can be understood in the fact that:
i)

The surveyed companies are likely to have answered to the questions truthfully,
due to the trust built through the business relationship between Kroll and its client;

ii)

The surveyed companies remain anonymous, thus stimulating truthful insights;

iii)

The surveys are conducted for business purposes; therefore the categorization of
the data matches the practice-oriented tone of the research.

Similar surveys from other companies have been used, especially to compare the results in a
given timeframe, or to compare geographic differences. The use of diversely sourced surveys
reinforced their validity, since the results of same-year same-place surveys show almost no
difference between different companies’ reports.

5.4.

Case study

The research is based on two ideas:
(i)

The existing link between malicious business behavior and international security
issues;

(ii)

The inability of the checklists, drafted by the law, to prevent the establishment of
partnerships with actors involved in corrupt practices.

To prove how current due diligence checklists are unable to cope with the complexity of
corrupt business practices, especially if they cross borders, one case study was selected.
Exposing the long-standing partnership between the Italian mafia and Somali organized
crime shows how such relationships have been formally undetectable for a long time, but
informal means of investigations – such as the reliance on media or human intelligence –
could have been able to uncover most of them.
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The case used was selected because it was possible to retrieve recently declassified
official reports and information; the case has developed over a long period of time, therefore
a great amount of media and public records is available.

6. The regulatory environment
The first step is to analyze the current state of the legislation, to benchmark the effectiveness
of current provisions. To do so, this section attempts to understand the reasoning behind the
law, and to see the level of relevance that is given to effective company control programs by
the law.
A comparison is made between the Italian legal environment, which is the one that is
analyzed in the project, and Emirati anti-corruption efforts. The UAE represents the business
hub of the Middle East; therefore understanding how the regulations fit within this context is
useful in grasping the limitations to the application of other countries’ regulations. Moreover,
the comparison is made to inspire further research. As the UAE’s anti-corruption efforts are
thriving there is a unique chance to influence this system to grow in the direction that is most
beneficial to regional security.

6.1.

Hard law requirements and consequences

Creating a legal obligation of due diligence is crucial. On one hand, this creates an obligation
of knowledge; this does not mean that without the management is necessarily willfully blind,
but this step ensures that the company develops a proper and organized information
acquisition process within its operations. Due to the importance of providing the court with
the information gathered before the deal, it becomes impossible for the private actor to
“legitimately plead ignorance regarding the background of a client or the source of his or her
funds” (Does de Willebois & World Bank, 2011, p. 24). On the other hand, since the
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company gathers and organizes the information, these potentially corroborate the public
sector’s intelligence at minimum cost.
In the following paragraphs, international, Italian and Emirati legislations associated
with fighting corruption will be analyzed, with the purpose of highlighting either an
obligation to perform due diligence, or at least to seek preventive measures. It will be shown
how most legislations distinguish between public-to-private and private-to-private corruption,
and almost none provides prevention-specific controls. It will be clear how the anticorruption strategy is responsive, through the use of harsh sanctions.

6.2.

The international binding instruments

At the international level, a number of instruments have been developed to bind countries to
the fight against corruption. The most notable is the 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Transaction, developed by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which strongly influenced following
international and national legislative interventions. However, the nature of the convention as
a “starting point” is clear, and numerous scholars and organizations have criticized its
inadequacy in covering foreign subsidiaries and foreign political parties, its lack of provisions
against facilitation payments and private-to-private corruption, and its lack of provisions
regarding preventive measures, with the exception of some accounting provisions (Biegelman
& Biegelman, 2010, p. 106).
The United Nations (UN) intervened in 2003, with the endorsement of the UN
Convention Against Corruption, which was adopted on December 14, 2005. The convention
was announced as “the first global instrument designed to assist Member States to fight
corruption in both the public and private sectors, and given the inclusion of a mechanism that
allows countries to recover billions in stolen assets, is considered a landmark achievement”
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(United Nations Information Service, 2005). At the same time, the United Nations included
an anti-corruption principle in the United Nations Global Compact, the policy initiative of the
organization to support corporate citizenship worldwide; the Global Compact calls
companies “to align their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in
the areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption” (United Nations, 2005).
At the European level, the 1997 European Union (EU) Convention on the Fight
Against Corruption criminalizes public and private, direct and indirect corruption. Of
particular interest is that the Convention assigns criminal liability to the management, for the
actions of their employees. However, it does not express an obligation of the member States
to also criminalize the management for the actions of the third parties. With that, the EU
adopted the 1995 Convention on the Protection of the Communities’ Financial Interests and
the Fight Against Corruption and its two protocols, and the 1997 Convention on the Fight
Against Corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member
States. In response to these conventions, the Council of Europe (CoE) issued a Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption in 2002, in order to strengthen the provisions on monitoring and
enforcement; the United States also signed it, in October 2000. To date, the CoE has
corroborated the Convention with the Civil Law Convention, the Committee of Ministers’
Resolution (99)5 establishing the “Group of States against Corruption”, the Committee of
Members of the CoE’s Resolution (97)24 establishing twenty guiding principles for the fight
against corruption.

6.2.1. The global influence of the FCPA
The 1977 United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has inspired each and every following
legal instrument, national or international. Scholars link this law with the 2005 United
Kingdom Bribery Act (UKBA); it is also a source of innovation for the anti-corruption
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doctrine. Following Chayes’s definition of revenue streams, the FCPA created the conditions
necessary for the State to capitalize on the fight against corruption, whilst curbing terrorist
financing. Because of the latter reason, it is no surprise that enforcement of the FCPA has
lately reached an all-time high, whilst in 2000 only one case was pursued by the federal
government, in 2009 there were 67 cases filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Barker et al., 2012, p. 44). In 2015 alone the
SEC pursued 9 cases (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2015). The rise in the average
number of fines imposed on companies has also grown exponentially, due to a willingness to
disgorge the profits obtained through corrupt practices. The unfortunate record is still held by
Siemens, which paid $1.6 billion to the US and German governments for a case of bribery
(Barker et al., 2012). Also, in 2010 the DOJ used undercover operatives from the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) for the first time, to enforce the FCPA provisions. In that case
it carried out the arrest of 22 executives of companies in the defense industry (Henriques,
2010).
The FCPA can be summarized into two provisions:
(i)

Anti-bribery provisions: a company cannot offer anything of value to a foreign
official, this being a public official of another country or of an international
organization, if this would trigger a misuse of power benefitting the company;

(ii)

Accounting provisions: if any payment, for whatever reason, is made to a foreign
official, this must be reported in the company’s financial statements.

The bodies responsible for the enforcement are the DOJ and the SEC. The first pursues
criminal behavior, the latter engages in civil actions. While the evidence obtained by the DOJ
has been used regularly by the SEC, it remains more difficult to prosecute a company on the
basis of the anti-bribery provisions because it is more difficult to obtain evidence of criminal
conduct (Deming, 2006).
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The mise-en-place of proper due diligence before the DOJ knocks on the door is
crucial. Mark Mendelsohn, former lead prosecutor of the DOJ for FCPA matters, stated that
one of the first things he did was ask for a due diligence report (Moritz & Block, 2008); in
particular, he would assess:
(i)

The information available to the company regarding its partner;

(ii)

The nexus between the company and the foreign official;

(iii)

The reputation of the target company.

What becomes clear, then, is that a company must have knowledge of the malicious behavior,
and it has a duty to perform due diligence to gain such knowledge. However, the mere lack of
proper due diligence, in the United States, cannot satisfy the “knowledge” requirement, since
this requires “recklessness plus conscious disregard with the aim of avoiding the truth”
(Barker et al., 2012, p. 48) as established by a federal court. Therefore, this requirement is
flexible in its nature too; as such recklessness must be weighted against the past record of the
management, and the personal history of each member of the board.
The preventive nature of the FCPA is what makes it a good support for the cause of
this research. Its ability to prevent corrupt practices, therefore, lies in the de facto obligation
to establish a compliance program with which companies identify high-risk operations and
perform regular anti-corruption audits. The existence of such a program significantly impacts
the likeability and scope of the charges brought by the DOJ and the SEC (McNulty, 2006, p.
12); moreover, the benefits of due diligence, as it will be shown further on, are not limited to
the prevention of the compliance risks.
However, the costs that a company must take into account to build a thorough
compliance program are considerable, and some scholars believe that zero-tolerance FCPA
enforcement raises the costs of monitoring operations, and “ultimately poses a risk of overdeterrence” (Yockey, 2011, p. 1). High levels of enforcement may even defeat the purpose of
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the law to create a fairer market, and its repercussions have the same outcome as corrupt
practices. Businesses may prefer to appear unprofitable to avoid any involvement in
corruption or risky activities (Bishara, 2011, p. 237).

6.2.2. The Italian legislation
Italy ranked 69th out of 175 countries in the Transparency International 2014 Corruption
Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2014). In 2011, the organization’s Bribe
Payers Index ranked Italy 15th out of 28 countries, with a score of 7.6 out of 10
(Transparency International, International Secretariat, 2011). To date, Italy is one of the
lowest ranked countries in Western Europe for corruption (where the lower, the worse).
The relevant anti-corruption provisions can be found in the Italian Criminal Code, in
the Italian Civil Code and in the legislative decree 231 of June 2001 (d.lgs. 231/01). In
particular, while the penal code criminalizes corrupt practices on Italian and foreign soil, the
d.lgs. 231/01 also encourages the creation of compliance procedures and controls through the
liability of companies and management for the actions of employees and third parties.
A look at anti-bribery regulations summarizes the ratio kept by the Italian legislator
well with regards to the criminalization of corrupt practices. The main difference sketched by
the law is between private-to-public and private-to-private corruption. The difference is not
only substantial because of the actors that can be pursued, and with regards to the sanctions,
but especially because the former is considered a crime, while the latter is defined as a civil
liability for the company, and a criminal one only for the individual. Moreover, the criminal
liability of the individual has even been introduced only recently, with the reform of Article
2635 of the Civil Code as made by the Law 190/2012.
Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Italian law punishes all the actors involved
equally: in the emblematic case of bribery, for instance, both the giver and the receiver face
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the same consequences. Additionally, while no difference is provided for the prosecution of
Italian and EU officials, non-EU foreign officials are exempted from punishment in the event
of occurring corrupt practices. This obligated choice is a clear consequence of the limits to
sovereignty, as one of the Italian Criminal Code’s founding principles is that of territoriality1.
However, it could be argued that the extension of the criminalization of conduct to a non-EU
official could be possible with a broad interpretation of the locus commissi delicti definition,
which could envisage such criminalization based on the repercussion of the foreign criminal
conduct on the Italian economy and companies.

Actors

Type

References

Consequences for company
2

Private
to Public

Active
Passive

Private to nonEU Foreign
Official

Active

Criminal Code (Art. 317,
318, 319, 319quater,
320, 321, 322);
d.lgs. 231/01 (Art. 25)

Private to EU
Foreign Official

Active
Passive

Criminal Code (Art.
322bis)

Private
to Private

Active
Passive

Alternatively or additionally:
3
• fine of 200-600 quotas;
• temporary suspension;
• suspension/revocation of authorizations or
licenses;
• prohibition from doing business with the public
administration;
• exclusion/revocation from subsidies;
• prohibition from advertising the products.
Alternatively or additionally:
• fine of 200-400 quotas;
• in case of considerable profit after the
commission of the crime, the sanction may be
increased by 1/3.

Civil code (Art. 2635);
d.lgs. 231/01 (Art. 25)

Table 1: Criminalization of bribery in the Italian legal system.

Once the criminalization scheme behind the Italian system has been understood, it should be
noted that companies, as legal entities, are entitled to a series of protections. Specifically, it
appears relevant to our cause that the adoption and implementation of an effective and
systematic compliance program makes it possible for the company to be exempted from
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2
3

Italian Criminal Code, Art. 6.
Other measures may be also undertaken as a pre-judgment remedy.
The value of the quotas ranges from a minimum of € 258,00 to a maximum of € 1.549,00.

	
  

28	
  

	
  

liability that arises from the actions of its management. The lack of such a program does not
constitute a crime itself, but it would also not satisfy the requirements for liability exemption.
(Baker&McKenzie, 2014, p. 63). It has become a standardized practice to corroborate
company policies with such compliance programs, but their effectiveness is worrying.
Moreover, the lack of a regulator with exclusive jurisdiction for corrupt practices leaves the
issue to the competence of the individual judge; on the other hand, it makes it possible for
every prosecutor to open an investigation.
There are three conclusive considerations to this brief analysis, which will be crucial
to shape the final recommendations:
(i)

In a legal context where both active and passive corruption are prosecuted, it is
clear that none of the parties involved is encouraged to speak up; public
prosecutors have often been able to detect corrupt dynamics emerging from
accounting fraud investigations, and by following the money trail. While this type
of fraud has been decriminalized for several years, in 2015 the crime of accounting
fraud was reintroduced, but it is still seriously lagging behind, as was also stated by
the preoccupied Corte di Cassazione (Ferrarella, 2015);

(ii)

Equal sanctions for active and passive actors involved in corrupt practices appear
inconvenient, as they promote closure and do not make it convenient to speak up.
At the same time, prosecutors that find themselves in need of information cut deals
with one of the parties, without following strict legal boundaries. Whistleblowing
appears protected but not encouraged;

(iii)

The application of the theory of the choice of revenue streams does not seem
completely applicable: the Italian legal system implements anti-corruption laws,
and at the same time does not invest in the prosecution of corrupt practices. This
way, it lies in a limbo where it does not capitalize in either direction; the
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consequence is that it neither promotes nor expresses interest in the fight against
corruption.

6.2.3. The Emirati anti-corruption legislation
It seems very useful to draw the empirical concepts formulated in the earlier sections down to
the reality of the situation in one of the most recently emerging markets. The Gulf region has
been drawing the attention of the world in the last twenty years, due to its unparalleled
growth and impermeability to regional turmoil. Particularly, the UAE emerge positively, as
Qatar is the runner-up, despite its growing international recognition as a decisive diplomatic
ally of the West in the region; Saudi Arabia is often perceived as having restrictive
regulations; Bahrain and Kuwait are affected by constant political struggle, and Oman cannot
be considered as financially capable as its neighbors. The UAE’s gross domestic product has
increased more than eight-hundred percent since 1995, thanks to the exploitation of oil
reserves, but also because of its massive trade liberalization policies (Bertelsmann Stiftung,
2014, p. 4). The economic attractiveness of the UAE is reflected in the fact that more than
3,000 foreign companies are currently operating in the country, accounting for sixteen
percent of total investment inflows to all Arab economies (Uddin & Hassan, 2013, p. 2).
However, “the shift from a controlled to a free economy has increased the potential
for risk” (Adawi & Rwegasira, 2011, p. 274). Even if such high-liberalizations make it
possible to adopt national laws and regulations in line with those of the international
counterparts (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007, p. 883), with regards to anti-corrupt practices rules
has proved incredibly difficult due to the radicalization of corrupt business practices in the
country, and in the Middle East as a whole, as they are seen as “the way to make things
happen”, particularly in the oil, pharmaceutical, automotive, defense, health care and
industrial goods sectors (Loughman & Sibery, 2012, p. 275). Additionally, within the
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political system, the ruling families of the UAE have felt “little necessity (…) to substantially
raise the institutional capacity of governmental organs” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 4).
The Emirati government, however, has implemented a number of legal tools to fight
corrupt practices, especially in the last decade. Notably, it has ratified the UN Convention
against Corruption, and joined the Arab Anticorruption and Integrity Network. The recently
established State Audit Institution, the authority in charge of auditing the use of public
finances, was tasked in 2012 with the drafting of a first national anticorruption legislation,
but it has since remained inactive (Kroll, 2015, p. 73). Also, a number of other calls for fresh
anticorruption laws have remained unanswered. Therefore the UAE has remained formally
tied to a mix of provisions coming from different regulations. However, these shortcomings
have also been paralleled by nation-wide interventions and federal authorities specifically
aimed at fighting corruption. Particularly in Dubai, and after the real estate crisis of 2008, the
transparency of governmental bodies has increased, placing stricter controls on financial
services and oil and gas services (Loughman & Sibery, 2012, p. 279). The main
anticorruption provisions today in force are:
(i)

UAE Constitution, Article 62, prohibiting Ministers from performing financial or
commercial work and from participating in commercial transactions with the
government;

(ii)

UAE Federal Law 1/2004 on combating terror crimes, which contains provisions
on money laundering and terrorist financing;

(iii)

UAE Federal Law 2/2006 on combating cybercrime, which contains provisions on
bribery and embezzlement, as well as money laundering and fraud;

(iv)

UAE Federal Law 21/2001 on the civil service, regulating the roles of civil
servants and their behavior;
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(v)

UAE Federal Law 4/2000 concerning the Emirates Securities and Commodities
Authority and Market;

(vi)

UAE Federal Law 3/1987, establishing and enacting the Emirati Criminal Code;

(vii)

Civil Transaction Law 5/1985 on the criminal liability of the employer for the
misconduct of the employee.

As a general rule, both management and employees of a company are liable for the criminal
conduct of a business. The UAE Commercial Companies Law specifies that all companies,
“regardless of their structure, is criminally liable together with their representatives” if they
violate any of the before mentioned provisions (Baker&McKenzie, 2014, p. 124).
The UAE regulator also made the choice to divide corrupt practices on the basis of the
involvement of the public sector through its officials. Once again, a look at the anti-bribery
laws makes the stance of the legislator clear; unfortunately, it is not a straight-forward job to
gather and understand the actions envisaged in the law as criminal conducts, and it is even
harder to foresee the relative consequences. The provision on private-to-private bribery as
included in Article 236 of the Criminal Code for example, appears to consider only the
accepter of a bribe as criminally liable; however, the Commercial Companies Law and
Federal Law 4/2000 state that any entity can be considered liable both for its actions and
inactions that result in the facilitation of such practice. The issue becomes even more unclear
when trying to sketch the rules against bribery of foreign officials, since the UAE has ratified
the UN Convention against Corruption, but has not issued a separate law to implement it. A
legal review by the international firm Baker&McKenzie underlined how the existence of
compliance programs in no way affects the extent of criminal liability for the involvement in
corrupt practices (Baker&McKenzie, 2014, p. 127). However, a huge peculiarity of the
Emirati legal system is that the public prosecutor holds a high degree of discretion over the
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cases to be pursued in court, and this principle has led to large inconsistencies in the
interpretation and application of the law.

Actors

Type

References

Consequences for people (companies not clear)
Alternatively or additionally:
• Confiscation of the sum accepted;
• Fine of the amount of the bribe;
• Imprisonment from 5 to 10 years for the public
official; up to 5 years for the briber.

Criminal Code, Art. 5
Private
to Public

Private to
Private

Active
Passive

Passive

(and laws related)

Alternatively or additionally:
• Confiscation of the sum accepted;
• Fine of the amount of the bribe;
• Imprisonment up to 5 years.

Criminal Code, Art. 236

Table 2: Criminalization of bribery in the Emirati legal system.

The peculiar character of the Emirati environment is that both politics and business are
conducted at a personal level and, in some respects, there may be double standards when it
comes to local Emiratis versus foreigners, and between foreigners themselves. The guiding
principle of stakeholder interaction, specifically in the UAE but also in most Middle Eastern
countries, is wasta: this concept “defies easy translation, but is at its essence a notion of
family obligation and nepotism, as well as social power and influence”. The obligatory
nature of favoritism is proportional to the social ranking and ties of an individual, which
often is used to influence public officials in the process of performing their duties.
In summary, it is important to observe that, in the UAE, anti-corruption and
corruption coexist fairly coherently, both as well-managed revenue streams and as power
stabilization tools. Ms. Vintiadis, of Kroll, described corrupt practices as short-term
strategies, which affect the success of the long-term strategy that is compliance. This
definition appears of particular relevance when applied to the economic behavior of the UAE.
The controlled nature of companies operating in this market implies that “short-termist
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behaviors are less frequent than in jurisdictions with dispersed ownership” (Boubaker &
Nguyen, 2014, p. 556); therefore, the economic strategy of the UAE entails:
(i)

The implementation of anti-corruption schemes to capitalize on fines and on the
attraction of foreign investments;

(ii)

The durability of elitarian corruption dynamics in order to ensure power
stabilization and short-term capital gain.

The developing nature of the Emirati legal system, the evolving concept of transparency, the
absence of “relevant precedents, the lack of a litigation culture and the lack of institutions
such as shareholder associations all act as barriers” (Boubaker & Nguyen, 2014, p. 557).
Some scholars doubt the willingness of the current government to engage in a long-term
development of the institutional framework, whilst seeking instead just “good financial
position of the country” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, p. 25). In conclusion, it is possible to
understand that in the UAE the real issues are those of the newcomers to the market. At the
same time, the low investment allocation of foreign portfolios in the region makes it hard to
influence governance culture and balance visions.

6.3.

Conclusion: business ethics as compliance checklists

“Any law, regulation or policy is only as good as its enforcement” (Transparency
International, 2009, p. 157). More and more, compliance with anti-corruption regulations and
risk management are becoming two sides of the same coin. This is because the main reason
for the private sector to perform the controls required by the law is to reduce the risk of being
fined, which would ultimately impact the short-term return on investment and the long-term
reputation of the business. However, this idea is not as straightforward as it may seem. When
a company faces different obligations arising from many fronts; from the laws of the country
of operations, to those of the country of origin, to those of the international community, to the
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guidelines issued by pan-national organizations, and hundreds of recommendations on good
governance, the cost of compliance becomes very high. Sometimes, it appears less expensive
just to be fined. However, the growing prosecution of corrupt practices has cornered larger
companies particularly, and has made them rationalize their due diligence policies in order to
find the cheapest way to comply with the law, while still being able to carry out proper due
diligence in bulk.
Parallel to this, governments have understood the need to simplify and organize
compliance requirements. They have produced a number of guidelines for the end-employee,
both for companies and for the public officers who need to check piles of paperwork every
day. This has resulted in the issue of checklists; companies are required to answer a specific
set of questions and for each question to provide some paperwork that justifies the answer.
To certify that a third party is not affiliated to the mafia, for example, the company will need
to acquire a pre-compiled form from the public administration that states so. Of course the
procedure is based solely on formal elements of investigations, such as past record or the
presence of off-shore financial activities. It could not be any different: the public sector must
ensure the highest level of justice and fairness in the risk evaluation, and it cannot rely on
informal data such as an Internet search to adjudicate the cleanliness of a deal. However,
reducing due diligence to a checklist exercise severely threatens the effectiveness of the law
and, in particular, the investments of the private sector.

7. Case study: mafia toxic waste and weapon trafficking to Somalia
To showcase the consequences of bureaucratized due diligence, the case study of Somalia
and waste trafficking has been selected. An analysis of the unresolved and long-standing
issue of illicit waste dumping in Somalia, by the mafia, in exchange for weapons, has shown
how a company wanting to do business with any of the many protagonists of the following
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scandals, would not have been aware of their involvement if it followed standard practice (or
at least it would have had plausible deniability). Ultimately, this case illustrates the need to
institutionalize a further level of control when dealing with high-risk environments.

7.1.

Summary of the events

On March 20, 1994, the Italian journalist Ilaria Alpi (Ilaria) and her cameraman Miran
Hrovatin (Miran) were driving through the city of Mogadishu (Somalia) in their Toyota
vehicle en route to the Amana Hotel. They had just returned from Northern Somalia, where
they had interviewed “the Sultan of Bosaso” Abdullah Mussa Bogar. The two were in the
country to investigate the operations of the UN mission to Somalia, “Restore Hope”, in which
the Italian military also participated. They planned to return to Italy the following day. Close
to the hotel, a Land Rover blocked their way, and at least seven people opened fire with
AK47s, killing Ilaria and Miran; the murderers then fled the scene. In 2014, the Italian
government declassified around 8,000 documents and reports. Since that day, for twenty
years judiciary investigations have followed one after another, to such a point that two years
after the events Giuseppe Pititto, assigned to the case by the general prosecutor Michele
Coiro, ordered the exhumation of the bodies. The Sultan of Bosaso was accused of being the
instigator of the murder, but the charges were later dropped.
The government constituted a parliamentary commission of inquiry but, after
investigating the murder from 2003 until 2006, under the coordination of Carlo Taormina
(Taormina), it did not reach a unanimous verdict. However, the official position was that the
murder was to be considered a failed attempt to kidnap the journalists by Somali pirates. For
some time, Taormina also corroborated the thesis that the two were in Somalia on holiday,
and that the allegation of an execution was just media speculation. The judiciary
investigations brought Hashi Omar Hassan (Hashi) to Rome in order to testify on alleged
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violations of human rights carried out by the Italian military on Somali population. The man
was arrested and prosecuted for the murder of the journalists but was acquitted in a first
instance. He was sentenced to life imprisonment after an appeal, and then to 26 years by the
Corte di Cassazione. The case was then re-opened in an attempt to find the other members of
the commando and to look into the reasons for the murder, with no results.
In 2010, the media reported a possible re-opening of the judiciary proceedings: Ali
“Gelle” Rage Ahmed, the main accuser of Hashi, was brought to court and charged with
slander. Ilaria’s mother, Luciana Alpi, still believes that Hashi was just a scapegoat. The
murder of Ilaria and Hrovatin is just one of the many mysterious deaths linked to the traffic
of toxic waste and weapons to Somalia. Also Natale De Grazia, captain of the port captaincy
of Reggio Calabria, should be remembered, as he was poisoned on December 13, 1995, on
his way to La Spezia to report on the illicit trafficking of toxic waste, and on his findings
about 180 ships maliciously sunk together with their toxic loads. In this instance, the public
prosecutor in charge of the investigation, Gaetano Pecorella, described the death of the
captain “one of the unresolved mysteries of” Italy.

7.1.1. Toxic waste and weapon trafficking to Somalia
Between 1988 and 1994 Greenpeace made public 94 cases, concluded or attempted, of toxic
waste trafficking towards the African shores, totaling more than 10 million tonnes. Some
ships, after years of sailing and numerous failed attempts to drop the load in exotic areas,
dumped the load in unknown areas, or inexplicably sunk in clear weather conditions, without
sending rescue signals, and without crew onboard. None of these sunken ships has ever been
located. In the second half of 1988, more than 364 barrels filled with toxic waste were found
on the Turkish coast of the Black Sea; most of the waste, if not all, came from Italy
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(Greenpeace, 2010). It became clear that illegal disposal agreements were in place between
Italian companies and Somalia, but the role of the governments was never exposed.
At the beginning of the Nineties, the director of the United Nations Environmental
Program (UNEP), Mustafa Tolba declared in an interview, during a seminar at the
International Center for Forestry Research in Nairobi, that he was aware of at least one
million tonnes of toxic waste illegally dumped in Somalia by Italian companies. Although he
did not reveal any names, he stated that the perpetrators were “traffickers seeking big profits,
able to kill whoever gets in their way” (Ansa, 1992a). The UNEP re-published the statement,
without adding any details. The Somali provisional Ministry of Health engaged in this fight
with the signature of an agreement, but without adding information about its content.
However, the Egyptian newspaper Al Hayat, published the entire contract, on September 9,
1992, where the Somali government delegated the construction and management of a toxic
waste treatment plant to the Swiss company Asher Partners-Lamonta until 2011. The plant
would have had the capability to manage 500,000 tonnes of toxic waste per year, and the
contract included a provision which stipulated that involvement in any illegal activity would
lead to termination of the concession. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time,
Emilio Colombo, was on his way to Nairobi at that very time and declared that he was not
aware of such a contract, and that he was unpleasantly surprised that such news was released
on the occasion of his visit. Both the provisional president of Somalia Ali Mahdi and his
opponent, Mohamed Farah Aidid, then declared that Italian companies took advantage of the
ongoing conflict to dump waste in the Indian Ocean in exchange for weapons to the armed
groups inside the country (Ansa, 1992b). However, the abovementioned contract was signed
by Ezio Scaglione, an Italian honorary consul to Somalia, who was also an associate of Guido
Garelli and Giancarlo Marocchino. These two men, who were close to Ali Mahdi, were later
arrested a number of times for very different reasons, the first being illegal trafficking of
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nuclear waste and trafficking in firearms. However, they were also found to be tied to the
secret service agencies of different countries, from Italy, to the United Kingdom and the
United States (Scavo, 2011).
In 2000, the Italian association named after Paolo Borsellino, a judge who lost his life
in 1992 in a mafia retaliation attack, organized a public debate in which Massimo Scalia, at
that time president of the Parliamentary Commission on the ecomafia,4 revealed that the
commission had submitted a large amount of evidence to the judiciary that linked the Sicilian
mafia with the waste treatment industry. In particular, he stated that from the evidence
presented it had emerged that there were strong ties between special waste treatment and the
illegal trafficking of weapons, underlining how one of the main hubs of such traffic was
found in Somalia.
Similarly, in 2005 the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) issued a press release
publicly asking the Italian government to disclose its knowledge about the illegal trafficking
of waste, and it released the names and roles of the actors involved, such as the Swiss
company Oceanic Disposal Management (Ansa, 2005a). At the same time, the ongoing
Parliamentary Commission for the investigation of waste dumping followed the links
between waste trafficking and Centro Enea, exposing the fact that the Antimafia Distrectual
Directorate (DDA) had been aware of the involvement of the establishment in the traffic of
nuclear waste to Somalia since 1999, but also of plutonium to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (Ansa,
2005b).
With time, many other names came out of the reports from environmental
organizations or from the press in general. To date, however, the convictions are still few,
and disappearing documents are many (Ansa, 2014). Moreover, as recently as on October 6,
2015, a shipment of used vehicles belonging to the Italian Army was stopped at the port of
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Sector of the mafia dealing in the trafficking of environmentally hazardous substances.
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Salerno, allegedly on its way to the Somali extremist group Al Shabab; the Customs Agency
also reported shipments of toxic waste disguised as furniture, constantly intercepted on their
way to the African countries. (Ansa, 2015).
7.2.

Conclusion: the limits of checklists

In the case presented, a company with good intentions would never have spotted the blatant
criminal behavior of the parties involved, if it had based its due diligence only on the
checklists provided by the public administration. Compliance with the law would have not
meant shelter from wrongdoing. Especially in this case, informal sources such as blogs,
environmental organizations’ reports and news sources would have been crucial to the
understanding of the events the of the people involved, as they reported names and facts that
were not being judicially pursued. Formal compliance does not seem to have been sufficient
to stimulate further research on the side of the companies, who would have merely performed
governance on paper, whilst “governance in spirit” (Boubaker & Nguyen, 2014, p. 559)
would, conveniently, have not been present at all.

8. The further step: corporate intelligence
Companies have three different interests that lead them to investigate their business partners:
(i) fear of being fined, in case they do not comply with the necessary legal provisions; (ii)
fear of a bad reputation, since being associated with corrupt partners would mean losing the
trust of their current partners and customers; (iii) willingness to gain leverage to be more
competitive and maximize returns.
Currently, the legal provisions leverage the first two types of interest in order to
enforce anti-corruption regulations. The third one, however, is left to the judgment of the
company that decides how and when to engage in activities that allow it to gain that sort of
leverage; these activities consist of intelligence-gathering and business analytics. A
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corporation is able to gain true insights about a business partner or a given environment
through the use of these tools and, clearly, it is in the interest of the company for them to be
as detailed as possible.
This project argues that, in addition to the fear of being fined, companies should be
incentivized in their pre-deal intelligence operations – so-called corporate intelligence - since
the information gathered through these mechanisms can be relied on, and easily goes beyond
the basic checks currently required by the law. This section explains when corporate
intelligence should be carried out (‘flexible risk assessment mechanisms’), what it entails,
and its limitations. In conclusion, a number of obstacles to its implementation, as a standard
of practice, are outlined.

8.1.

Implementing flexible risk assessment mechanisms

As implied in the previous paragraph, risk management is a process, and it must be assessed
in steps. Failure to manage risk effectively can result in great financial losses, as well as
decreased shareholder value, reputational repercussions on both the brand and the managers,
the dismissal of current management and, “in some cases, the destruction of the business”
(Rao & Marie, 2007, p. 1). Today, established best practices make it safe to say that before
engaging in any due diligence, the risk of the deal or of the target company must be assessed
properly. Looking at the requirements of the FCPA and the UKBA it is possible to see how a
proper risk assessment procedure is also the first step for compliance.
This preliminary step allows the company to recognize and acknowledge anomalies
and red flags, therefore allowing a selective process of investigation. It is clear how this
phase is crucial. Too strict standards will waste the company’s money in unnecessary due
diligence, where too loose standards will underestimate risks and expose the company to
harsh repercussions. Understanding the scope of this flexibility principle is crucial for the
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assessment of the true final cost of the deal. On this point, Wold stated that even if “doing
what you are capable of is not insurance”, this is “the best measure against corruption when
dealing with third parties” (Wold, 2011, p. 107). Moreover, a tailored corruption risk
assessment might not necessarily spot red flags. It could also reveal a flourishing market that
was not considered before, or a favorable condition of stability in an emerging market
(Control Risks, 2011, p. 5).
Doctrine has covered the content of risk assessment and risk scoring programs well.
However, it falls short as concerns the different degrees of response triggered after the risk is
assessed. Concerning the management of the risk related to corrupt practices our research
distinguishes three tiers:
(i)

Compliance – Regulatory risk management involves the checklist exercise that was
described in the previous section. This first step is divided into different sub-steps,
such as resource allocation to the compliance department, training, cooperation
with law enforcement bodies, etc. However, the end objective is always to analyze
the law the affects a deal, to weigh the costs of non-compliance against the cost of
full compliance, and to make a choice about which boxes to tick, and how to tick
them cheaply. The underlying interests of this step are those of the public sector,
which promotes its agenda through the enforcement (or without) of these
provisions.

(ii)

Due diligence – Due diligence can, of course, be carried out for the sole purpose of
compliance. However, the due diligence envisioned in this step represents the extra
step that the company takes, to discover more about its interlocutor before closing
a deal, or before changing the strategic allocation of its assets. The underlying
interests of this step are those of the company itself, which proactively engages
with the investigation of its internal and external partners and its third parties in
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order to corroborate its compliance program, but also to discover elements useful
to the deal. This extra step has many sub-steps, because of the principle of
flexibility that will be summarized at the end of this section.
(iii)

Corporate intelligence – A company can go well beyond the mere collection of
information, if it is willing to learn about the reality of things. After it gathers
information, it will rearrange them in a way that is useful to anticipate risks, boost
commercial competitiveness, secure litigation black holes, and generally augment
investment awareness. Formally, this step is still referred to as “due diligence”,
even if some audacious professionals have given it different names. Among the
most popular: Navex Global and Control Risks call it “enhanced due diligence”,
Deloitte “business intelligence” and Kroll “corporate intelligence”. Kroll’s
wording is the one used throughout this research, since the process that it entails
goes well beyond regular “due diligence”, and it is not tied necessarily to
Information Technology and data mining like “business intelligence”. Corporate
intelligence makes use of both technology and human elements, and may not be
engaged for compliance reasons.

8.2.

The reasons for engaging

The imposition of the due diligence requirement on paper “is not enough” (Does de Willebois
& World Bank, 2011, p. 24). While off-the-shelf due diligence products, that focus on
ticking the boxes according to the requirements of the regulations, are surely useful to for the
first phase of risk assessment, as “generic toolkits for resisting corruption” (Control Risks,
2011, p. 3). However, as FCPA-like legislations develop and expand, a company must be
able to assess each risk it faces with an individualized approach.
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This idea is reinforced by the case of waste dumping in Somalia, but it does not need
to be understood under such extreme circumstances. Most emerging markets are
characterized by the presence of a “shadow economy”, meaning “an economic activity that is
not illegal per se, but which is carried out at least partly below the radar of official statistics
and regulations” (Transparency International, 2009, p. 83). While the shadow economy
across Asia, also known as the informal sector, accounts for an average of one third of the
GDP, in Africa it reaches and easily surpasses forty percent (Transparency International,
2009, p. 83) In the latter case, aiming due diligence at compliance will not give real insights
into the business that is being carried out, and will cause not only the failure of proper
business analytics, but also to will miss important investment opportunities simply for the
lack of knowledge of the operational environment. Engaging in these markets would not be a
blatant violation of the law, but it would still damage the company on the long run.
With regards to the UAE, the shift from “due diligence” to “corporate intelligence”
occurred after the financial crisis hit the Gulf economies in 2008. A number of lessons have
been learned since then, even if the absence of proper risk management processes was not the
factor that motivated the market fall. When companies in Dubai were asked how they
identified risk, in 2007, almost all insurance companies preferred the use of risk checklists.
The banks preferred the mixed use of financial statement analysis and credit score models. A
focus on Islamic finance firms revealed that risk assessment was not usually embedded in the
business processes, nor was its tools known by management (Rao & Marie, 2007, p. 4). Mr.
Dajani, from Kroll, explained how the drive for stronger controls was brought about by the
losses suffered by companies with the explosion of the market bubble, and was not
necessarily motivated by long-sighted governance change, but rather by a protectionist feel
with regards to the reduced finances. The change in corporate governance was, however, a
relevant consequence.
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A further step is to understand how the implementation of new rules, regarding
enhanced controls of business partners at the governance level, can constitute corporate
intelligence material. From here, it will be shown how such implementation at the Western
level can reduce risk in the Gulf.

8.3.

Corporate intelligence as a process
The particular flexibility of the needs of a company, that requires investigations of

any sort as well as the complex set of competences required to carry them out, increasingly
demanded for companies to entrust external firms to deal with the cases. Surprisingly enough,
scholars have lessened their attention to the study of the processes involving corporate
investigation firms, and in general to those organizations in the private sector that provide
“more sophisticated investigative and risk management services that target more serious and
complex crimes”.
These “gatekeepers” take the form of auditing firms, law firms, rating agencies, banks
and press agencies, as well as civil society organizations and governmental agencies.
Together they constitute a multifaceted market of investigative services, and create what
Transparency International calls a “corporate integrity system” (Transparency International,
2009, p. 43). Traditionally this system has been led by auditors, being perceived as
“pervasive” and “severe” (Halbouni, 2015, p. 117) in the detection of fraud. However, since
corrupt practices are deceptive in nature, those engaged “will understand the audit process
and develop schemes to circumvent the system” (Koltsov, 2013, p. 31). As a response, there
has been a growing trend, in the past decade, to use investigation firms in order to detect and
respond to suspicious business activities. Schneider attributes this trend to three factors: (i)
the “real and perceived” increase in economic crimes; (ii) the need for “highly specialized
expertise” and, especially, to (iii) the “inability of the State to unilaterally cope with the rising
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tide of economic crime”, which entails a endemic reluctance to cooperate with law
enforcement (Schneider, 2006, p. 287).
The elements that allow a corporate intelligence firm to be entrusted with the
investigations of a company are three:
(i)

In-house expertise – the presence of a broad skillset within the firm allows for
ready-to-deploy personnel in a large number of cases. Since understanding the
requests of companies and responding properly often requires approaching the
issue from many different angles, keeping an eye out for different red flags while
respecting numerous and very diverse regulations, the people involved must be
professionals characterized by experience, specific knowledge of the field of the
company, but especially an investigative attitude. Having these resources readily
available, not only in the employee-base of the firm, but also through a broad
network of handpicked consultants, can really make a difference in terms of the
time and radius of any response.

(ii)

Global reach – as markets evolve and expand, a company may often rely on
national business strategists, but may face worrying situations when doing business
abroad. When a company decides to hire an investigative firm, it expects to receive
answers about the current political, economic, and social situation from any corner
of the world. Most cases have a kind of foreign involvement, the most common
being the delivery of assets to the so-called “off-shore markets”. It is crucial for an
investigative firm to be able to deliver in a timely manner, and a worldwide
presence and expertise appears fundamental to do so.

(iii)

Access to sources – As seen, the main limitation on official information gathering
is that official sources, when present, are not enough to gain real insights about a
target company or a given market. Information must be mined from the details
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contained in public records, together with the media narration of events, and
completed with fieldwork to retrieve it from sources on the ground. An
investigative firm must have the necessary expertise to know where to find the
information in any system, how to combine it, and how to benchmark it with the
intelligence present among the people on the ground.
It becomes clear that corporate intelligence cannot be compared to due diligence, as its scope
is not defined by the requirements of the law, but it is a process per se. A minority of scholars
foresee the necessity, in the next decade, for large corporations to implement investigative
capabilities in-house, which will act “as an insurance policy for their own survival” (Coburn,
2006, p. 351). However, the complexity of these operations and the peculiar expertise needed
to conduct them make it easier to outsource corporate intelligence to specialized firms.
Compliance is one part, but corporate intelligence becomes capable of much more since, if
carried out properly, it can give a holistic overview of the environment in which a deal is
investigated.

8.3.1. Issues with searches of the public records
The starting point for any investigation is to search the records publicly available.
These records vary, and are placed under the control and management of different public
authorities. The first issue is to know where to look, as it may not always be clear. However,
this is not the highest hurdle for an investigator to jump. In the countries that host the most
emergent markets, public records are scant, or simply non-existent. Without thinking too far
from the basics, international watch lists may also appear simply too complicated to use.
While unified search systems have been developed for law enforcement, the private sector is
left to dig into the scant tools at its disposal, which are often difficult to gain access to and to
use, thus limiting access to information that could be vital. Moreover, public records in

	
  

47	
  

	
  

developing countries can be easily manipulated, therefore they are not reliable. Everett-Heath
and Dajani of Kroll testified how, in the UAE, the increasingly obligatory corporate
disclosure mechanisms are paralleled with elitarian control on what is disclosed. Fieldwork
experience has also revealed that access to these records is incredibly difficult if only for
reasons of bad informatics.

8.3.2. Issues with the press and other media
The media reflect not only facts, but also society’s perception of those facts. Because of this,
newspapers, blogs, conference talks and any kind of media record can constitute an
incredibly valuable tool for the understanding of events and the reputation of a target
company. In the case of waste-dumping in Somalia, most of the names of the companies and
people involved in the facts were published in the media long before they were officially
released to the public – and most still haven’t been released officially due to privacy laws.
The first issue that an investigator faces when interpreting facts in the media
concerning the reputation of a subject or company is the partiality of news. Everett-Heath of
Kroll summarized it well how “the media always serves a purpose; but it is not the purpose”
(Everett-Heath, 2015). For this reason, the retrieved information will have big gaps,
especially in the explanation of events. Moreover, the investigator will need “to factor into
that the motivation of individual journalists” (Everett-Heath, 2015). Therefore, the
investigator will not only have the duty to report the statements of the media, but also on the
“whys” and “hows” of such statements, and to link these reasons to the deal that the client is
trying to engage in. Different media produce different qualities of information; Everett-Heath
also differentiated between “negative facts” and “negative noise” (Everett-Heath, 2015). Both
of them must be analyzed and reported to the client, and both of them can be more or less
damaging to his or her reputation. While an investigator must be able to retrieve and select
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appropriate information, a corporate intelligence analyst must also be good at linking this to
the client’s needs.
The second issue is the language/cultural barrier. While it is possible to retrieve news
articles about the same facts in different languages, and a company’s ability to rely on an
international employee-base may allow some gaps to be filled, many informal news
providers, such as blogs and vlogs, report facts with dialects, or make reference to locally
known facts or ideas. What may constitute a minor red flag for the casual reader could be
understood as the symptom of a greatly corrupt system by someone with local knowledge of
the social dynamics. This is particularly true in the analysis of reputational intelligence. A
good understanding of the social dynamics that form reputation are fundamental in foreseeing
the repercussions of doing business with the target company.
The third issue with media sources is the volatility and dynamicity of news. Media
profiles change overnight. During the researcher’s experience with Kroll, for example, the
media uncovered a huge financial scandal involving a company that a client had made a
request to vet, just the day before presenting the results of the investigation to the client. In
the same tone, the American investigative firm Protiviti brought the example of Bernie
Madoff who, if investigated before December 10, 2008, would have been reported as the
former president of NASDAQ, and an excellence of the securities industry; the day after he
was on every newspaper as the fraudster who stole more than 50 billion American dollars
thanks to a massive Ponzi scheme (Lenzner, 2008; Protiviti, 2014, p. 11).

8.3.3. The role of human intelligence
The main characteristic of corporate intelligence is the use of human source enquiries to fill
the information gaps and to gain the tools required to interpret information in the field. This
critical stage is carried out differently between corporate intelligence firms, and the way this
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is done, as well as the quality of the sources, is often what makes a firm successful or not. In
the case of Kroll, for example, human intelligence is gathered thanks to the global presence
of the company, which relies on subcontractors in almost every country of the world.
Contrary to common belief, human intelligence gathering is very rarely pursued by covert
means. Moreover, in many countries covert private investigations are illegal, and severely
punished. The risk of conducting illegal activities falls not only on the people involved, but
also on the investigative firm; if the client is exposed, the firm will most likely suffer from
massive reputational downfall.
Therefore, there are four characteristics of proper human intelligence:
(i)

The closer the better – in order to investigate a company or a person, the best
intelligence can be retrieved from the people closest to the target. However, this
may be hard to do without alarming the people involved and without risking
compromising the position of the client who requested the investigation. While
there are no fixed rules on how to choose sources, a good investigator will be able
to understand where he can retrieve information from safely.

(ii)

Sources must be diversified – often the range of sources from which is possible to
retrieve information is limited. Different links should be investigated, in order to
gain the broadest possible range of opinions.

(iii)

Prejudices must be reduced to a minimum – while the quality of the human
intelligence mostly depends on the personal abilities of the investigator, he or she
must be careful not to influence the source with his or her knowledge of the facts.

(iv)

Reporting must be thorough - since human intelligence gathering constitutes the
most expensive step of intelligence gathering, it is usually left till last, in order to
gather all the preliminary findings first, and to benchmark them with the
information mined on the field after. However, there might be the tendency to
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confirm the initial ideas, instead of taking the new information to reinterpret the
known facts. This should not happen, and the investigator is required to start with a
fresh mind, in order not to stretch the new information to fit the old report. In some
cases, it may be good practice to let another investigator take over this part.

8.3.4. Database-driven information gathering
Social media platforms are incredible tools for human intelligence assessments. Given the
growing “share-mania”, the Internet is filled with personal information that has been freely
disclosed by those directly concerned or by their friends and acquaintances. This is available
to everybody, through open source tools and it is possible to collect that information that
people publish and to put them together, de facto gathering usable intelligence.
With this example in mind, let’s apply this concept to the traces left behind whilst
navigating the Internet, and which are memorized by databases, websites visited, searches
made, language used and how it is used. In addition to this, let’s add the information that can
be found in the media and in public records. Finally, let’s add all the other information that is
publicly available but usually ignored. In Dubai, for example, every time an official
document is lost, the owner must make a public announcement before being able to receive a
new one. This concept of huge, fetch-all databases containing all kinds of information has
been exploited by law enforcement agencies for decades. The example of the different NSA’s
profiling tools as exposed by Edward Snowden comes first. However, this methodology is
well known in the private sector as well. In an interview, Michael Olver of Pacific Strategies
and Assessments (PSA) described how the last decade has been characterized by the
establishment of a growing number of technology-driven firms, which gather data from any
possible source and throw it into a database, to make it available to companies or
investigators. He even described how one particular firm started out by collecting the
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schedules hanging outside every Emirati court, since companies did not have a duty to
disclose their involvement in litigation, but it was possible to read out the names of the
parties involved and type of hearing from those schedules (Olver, 2015).
These databases make use of two different kinds of information:
(i)

Structured data – meaning all that information that “lies within a record or file”
(Koltsov, 2013, p. 31): financial statements, vendor lists, real estate records;

(ii)

Unstructured data – meaning all that information, such as emails, press articles,
radio interviews that must be processed to identify specific patterns or sentences
before being inserted into a database.

While some firms’ business is that of filling in global databases, the real power lies in
business analytic. These processes rely on complex algorithms to profile users, to learn and
foresee their behavior. With regards to anti-corrupt practices investigations, “examining raw
business data provides evidence-based inferences that can verify or disprove” a particular
strategy. However, it is surprising to see that business analytics have not yet been
implemented as a standard of practice, mainly since “there is a lack of understanding on how
analytics” work (Koltsov, 2013, p. 30).

8.4.

Current obstacles to corporate intelligence

8.4.1. For the company in business
Fear of disclosure of findings - Most legislative efforts are reactive. This approach entails that
the judiciary and the law enforcement agencies are culturally tied to the idea of prosecuting
criminals, rather than seeking justice. As Vintiadis from Kroll analyzed, in the case of
internal investigations, any voluntary disclosure will lead the public prosecutor to think that
there is much more that has not been disclosed, and he or she will push even harder to
investigate the wrongdoing (Vintiadis, 2015). It is clear that a company will not disclose any
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fact regarding its business other than the mandatory, in the hope of not being exposed.
However, the skepticism of the public prosecutor is not just a matter of culture. Article 132 of
the Italian Criminal Code states that “the public prosecutor has an obligation to enforce the
penal action, and to this end he will start the investigation whenever he receives a service of
offence notice”.

Prohibitive costs - The difference between due diligence and corporate intelligence reports is
to be found not only in the content, but also on the price tag. While a due diligence report
may cost as little as a few hundred American dollars and be delivered in a few hours, a
thorough corporate intelligence report may take many weeks, and prices may range between
5,000 to 75,000 American dollars, depending on the amount of people involved in the
investigation, the documents collected and the time spent connecting the dots. While a bigger
company may be able to afford these costs for a number of deals selected thanks to the
principle of flexibility formulated in the early chapters of this research, SMEs find it very
difficult – if not impossible - to make this a routine practice. As was also stated earlier, SMEs
are the actors in society that must be most empowered with the tools for economic stability,
as they are those who make the greatest contribution to security and social stabilization in
countries that face strong economic and political hardships.

8.4.2. For the corporate investigation company
Prosecutions of investigative firms – Most Middle Eastern legislation provides strict controls,
or even outlaws private investigations. While corporate intelligence firms are usually
registered as risk management firms or consultancy firms, this limitation still means that most
of the human intelligence tools commonly used by investigative firms are out of the equation,
or must follow prohibitive rules. It becomes particularly problematic when the same firms,
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with different offices in many countries, are allowed to disclose certain findings in one
country, but may face tough sanctions in the other.

Lack of an accessible intelligence infrastructure – The centralization of controls by law
enforcement agencies does not match the diffused nature of information. Reluctance to
cooperate may have different reasons: for instance, Schneider believes that it comes from the
perception that the private sector “has intruded on the traditional domain of the public
police”, and from the “concomitant trepidation among law enforcement personnel that an
increase in private policing will mean a diminution of the stature, power and resources of
public police” (Schneider, 2006, p. 306). However, the informal talks that were carried out
for the purposes of this research revealed less reluctance than expected, and the comments of
the professionals interviewed reflected hope, especially since many are former policemen and
already cooperate with their former colleagues on a day-to-day basis.

8.5.

Summary: the benefits of corporate intelligence

The means to gather corporate intelligence, as shown, are many and issuing another checklist
would be rather pointless. In fact, the power of corporate intelligence does not reside in the
means themselves, but in the expertise that it is carried out with and the “nose” for red flags
of the professionals involved. This is the main difference with due diligence. The purpose of
due diligence programs is to satisfy a fixed set of legal requirements, therefore the tools that
are used must be the focus, since on the day that wrongdoing is uncovered, the court will look
at how a company performed its checks. However, since the purpose of corporate intelligence
is to empower a company with knowledge about a business partner, a market, or new
possibilities, carrying out the checks required by the law is an added value, but the focus is
shifted to the truthfulness of the end result. Information that has been mined and modeled for
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corporate intelligence purposes is not meant to satisfy the law, but to give true insights; the
latter, however, happens to satisfy the law as well. Moreover, since the aim of a corporate
intelligence firm is that of satisfying its clients, it is safe to think that investigations will be
carried out legally – since the client’s reputation is at stake – and thoroughly – since offering
good products is what keeps the firm running.

9. Recommendations
9.1.

To the Italian legislator

Enhance the provisions against accounting fraud – Following the trail of money embezzled
via accounting fraud may lead to the discovery of corrupt practices. Enhancing these
provisions would mean giving the judiciary the tools to investigate further. Paralleling these
provisions with stronger protections for whistleblowers would then increase knowledge of
wrongdoing, and would provide more starting points for investigation.

Diversify the sanctions’ spectrum – implementing mechanisms of leniency for those who
come forward first can be a great tool to uncovering corrupt practices. Suggestions have been
made in the direction of the inclusion of rewards for individual informers (Transparency
International, 2009, p. 64); however, the gradual implementation of these provisions is
fundamental in ensuring proper application.

Incentivize the use of corporate intelligence – The effective implementation of compliance
programs should be rewarded. An additional step is to promote the use of enhanced
investigations with greater rewards, such as the inclusion in ethical whitelists, or the
cancellation from ethical blacklists. Sharing the information with law enforcement could also
constitute a ground for taxation benefits. Finally, stronger financial benefits should be given
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to SMEs that engage in effective controls of their partners, in order to promote their
involvement in the fight to corrupt practice.

Incentivize disclosure of corrupt practices – Article 132 of the Italian Criminal Code leaves
room for discretion within the limits of the law. With the development of an ad-hoc
legislation to promote disclosure of wrongdoing, it should be provided a power of discretion
for public prosecutor, which may choose to rely solely on the reports issued by an
investigative firm. This provision should include the requirements of such report to qualify
for such summary judgment, with a particular focus on the treatment of evidence materials.

9.2.

To the law enforcement bodies

Establish formal relationships with corporate intelligence companies – the adoption of
intelligence led policing (ILP) frameworks has been advocated for many years. This
methodology is based on the ideas of risk assessment and risk management; therefore it is
easy to be adopted by - and attractive to - private investigative firms. However,
“collaboration and the sharing of information and intelligence are critical to the success of
ILP (Budhram, 2015, p. 6). With ILP, the use of social network analysis (SNA) has become
increasingly popular among business intelligence firms, and it could also be implemented as
a common language between the private and the public sector as a way to share information.

9.3.

To the corporate investigation company

Embed in-house data analytics tools – investing in platforms for data analytics, especially
with the purpose of mining information from unstructured data, would allow for more
successful investigations. Moreover, such tools appear useful when the client-base and target
companies recur, since it allows information storage that can be automatically embedded in
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future searches. This technique may be particularly relevant when applied to social network
analysis, since it would allow the mapping and prediction of the relationships of a given
subject. With time, it would become easier and easier to identify the individuals that
constitute the intelligence fulcrums, therefore to identify human sources faster and more
effectively.

Invest in the development of SME-specific products – It is possible that the increase in the
need for corporate investigations will trigger an increase of large corporations’ in-house
expertise. This phenomenon will most likely affect those corporate intelligence firms that rely
solely or mostly on a client-base made up of larger companies. To contrast this reduced
demand, an investment should be made to re-brand the corporate intelligence firm, and to
make it attractive to SMEs.

9.4.

Conclusion

Both the public and the private sectors are prompted to engage in radical but coordinated
changes, where cooperation and communication are keys for success. However, despite the
scientific nature of this project, it should be understood that an approach too radical might
end up being idealistic, and not realistic. While the reforms proposed, especially at the
legislative level, may have the depicted benefits as first consequences, the historical and
social environment in which they are enacted may curb the upsides. For instance, the
introduction of a principle of discretional prosecution would surely promote autonomous
disclosure of wrongdoing, but would also present unfortunate risks of corruption of the
members of the judiciary, or favoritisms in general.
In the same way, even if the corporate intelligence firms are never directly prompted
to share their information with the public sector, the changes proposed in this project would
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enhance their relationship with law enforcement; without an the extension of the attorneyclient privilege discipline to these firms, the duty of loyalty to their clients would prevent any
form of cooperation with the law enforcement agencies.
This project aims at sketching a systemic reform in order to show how cooperation is
possible and mutually beneficial. Particularly, it aims at demonstrating how in the global
efforts to stabilize the Middle East, a number of steps can be taken also within the boundaries
of each country willing to contribute, while enhancing their rule of law.
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Annex I - The role of private corporate investigators in the system
Interview with Marianna Vintiadis, Country Manager for Italy at Kroll Associates, Oct 19,
2015

I: Would you like to tell me about Kroll and what is your role in the company?

M.V.: I have been working for Kroll for approximately 12 years now, and I am currently head
of the Milan office. The Milan office has the responsibility for a number of other territories
too: Greece, Spain and some commercial developments in the Balkans and Central and
Eastern Europe. Quite coverage, and there are limited resources. A lot of our work here is
protecting companies from taking risk that could otherwise be avoided. This can take
different forms, one of which can be a basic understanding of security and protection of
people, all the way to pre-transaction work, such as due diligence and compliance work that
assist companies in identifying certain red flags before making some decisions.

I: What I am looking for is to understand the shift in state regulations that started in the
Seventies but found its boom only in the last years. For this shift, the burden of preventive
investigations of white-collar crimes has been put on the companies themselves, rather than
on the State.

M.V.: I think there has been a bizarre interplay. For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA) clearly induced companies to undertake certain types of checks. Other things
came: for example, anti-money laundering legislation post 9/11, which also played big role
inducing people to conduct certain checks and know their client prior to accepting them for
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business. You are absolutely right: there has been a very clear institutional regulatory shift,
for which the burden goes back to the corporations rather than to the state.

I: What are the tools that companies have to do so, since they need, of course, to mirror those
of the government’s law enforcement bodies? How is your job different from that of the
police?

M.V.: In the private sector, a company may not have the same powers; you may have the
duties and responsibilities as according to the law, but you may not have the powers. In
reality, a lot of what is required is for the company to simply to conduct the check, but the
research itself has been done by the State. So, for example, you are required as a bank to
make sure that you are not providing finance for terrorism, but you do that by checking a list
that has been put together by a government or an international body: you are not required to
compile the list yourself; you are not required to identify Mr. X or Mr. Y as a terrorist and
conduct an investigation. All you need to do is to make sure you have checked that this
person has already been deemed associated with terrorism by your government.

I: Your colleague Kevin Braine said once in an interview to Compliance Week that “you
need to understand the level of diligence to conduct relating to who you are dealing with”.
What are these levels? If you say that a company just needs to fill in a bunch of checklists
and do some paperwork”, why are there levels at all?

M.V.: Back to the regulatory issue: the basic level would be to do exactly what the law
requires – check the lists: check that there isn’t an ongoing sanction, check that this person
isn’t on the FBI most wanted list. These are all published information, work carried out by
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someone else; but we may want to take an additional step because, by definition, anyone who
is on the list has already been found out, so you are just double checking to make sure that
you are not, by chance, by accident or by ignorance getting involved with someone who is
already known or indicated to be involved in something which you shouldn’t be involved in.
But what about the guy who today is not on the list but will be on the list tomorrow, because
they simply haven’t caught up with him? Additional steps on reputation and an understanding
of business practices and past record might help to form an idea of the risk of somebody who
is likely to end up on the list tomorrow. That’s what you are trying to mitigate: you are trying
to mitigate the damage caused by something that you may not have known for a fact today
but there may have been sufficient information around for you to be able to understand that
pretty soon somebody was going to be found out.

I: But then, a piece of the puzzle is still missing: we are saying that it’s the interest of the
regulatory system to prevent corruption because of purely publicistic needs of protection of
the civility of the economy; on the other hand, we are saying that companies have a direct
interest to conduct higher due diligence. I guess the company is not really keen to waste
money for public needs, but it’s more keen to save money and make profit. So, why are these
actions important for the corporate itself if it’s not required by the law? Isn’t there more
profit for companies who are involved in corrupt practices, than for those who are not?

M.V.: The FCPA and other similar types of legislation were set up in such a way that it
doesn’t make it in your interest, it makes it compulsory for you to check, and you are
responsible for the actions of your intermediaries to a very large extent. As a result, this has
removed the element of discretion and has taken away the possibility of a company to say “I
didn’t know”. This is exactly what this law was designed to stop you from doing. It says: you
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have a duty to check, and you are liable because your partners are doing this on your behalf,
and you are the one profiting for this. Now, whether this will always work and how you
defend yourself is a large, complicated matter. But the point is that the laws themselves make
it part of your business to check and to do everything you can to stop these people from
behaving in a certain way.

I: Should the State be doing it rather than imposing the burden of control on companies?

M.V.: This is a very good question, and it is one that I am sometimes in two minds about. But
truth is that for States it is very difficult, very expensive and it requires collaborations of
many different forces to conduct an international enquiry. An American policeman can’t go
and conduct his investigation in Paris all of a sudden; he needs to cooperate with a local
agency, and this made enforcing rules on international corruption very difficult. As a result,
in an international effort to combat corruption, the idea of involving companies actively in
this process was possibly the only way.

I: One school of thought states that corruption is good, because it facilitates the economic
transactions. If the legislation wasn’t there, would companies still be interested in fighting
corruption?

M.V.: First of all you need to make a distinction between what is known as facilitation
payment and “hard” corruption; some legislations will allow facilitation payments. A
facilitation payment will give you expedite service if wanted; it will give you the opportunity
to do something faster and cut through bureaucracy because you have paid somebody to do
work that was legal in the first place. So, for example, you need to get a license to do
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something in a certain country and it takes six months to usually get it; if you give the guy
fifty dollars maybe you can get it in a month.
That’s very different from corruption in the sense of not being entitled to receive the
license in the first place and paying somebody to get it: both involve bribing a public official,
but “oiling the wheels” facilitates the process, while the other one is there to give you an
unfair advantage - because the license belonged to somebody else, because you wanted to get
it when you shouldn’t have, because you are attacking protected forests, or whatever; two
very different processes. From the corporation’s point of view, sometimes you can pay a
small sum and you are allowed to do something completely legal and extremely profitable; a
company, in theory, could have good reasons for not being particularly aware about
corruption and not wanting to combat it.
When these things become systemic, it becomes quite complicated. Also if you are a
victim of fraud, you have no way of combating the issue because whatever you have done
and whatever advantage you have obtained has been obtained unfairly. From my personal
perspective, a market where players play by the rules is always going to be simply more
efficient and more transparent. The reality is, in so-called “one-shot situations”, whoever
pays the biggest bribe gets the prize: for example, gets in and builds the power plant for a
region where there was space for just one. These are the situations where corporations have
an unfortunate incentive to behave this way.

I: What I get is that bribery is a short term strategy to gain immediate benefits, but in the long
term a company might lose money because of fines, or because someone else bribes more.
Guaranteeing a fair market means investing in a more stable market, therefore long term
benefits. Am I right?
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M.V.: Yes: today you might have won because you paid the bribe first, but tomorrow you are
going to be really annoyed when somebody else pays the bribe before you, and you are cut
out even though you had the better product.

I: We said that we have formal checklists on one side; we will call those “means of formal
investigations”. Then there are a number of informal investigations that are carried out that
give more insights on the business partner. What are the informal investigation
methodologies?

M.V.: The first distinction we need to make is between officially recognized sources and
others that may exist but you don’t know what value to attach them. For example, if a
bankruptcy register says that you have had seven companies that went bankrupt – that is an
official source. In extreme cases it may have been manipulated or altered, but under normal
circumstances the official register is what gets checked and the result is what it is.
Then, you may have another type of information, like a blog: somebody makes an
allegation in a blog. Is it significant? Is it not significant? Is this a first warning sign or
something that is going to become huge, or just a mad man who just published something
random in bad faith? This is something that is unofficial, that requires analysis, that is
sometimes anonymous and sometimes isn’t. The same applies to the part of the press: clearly
the press in Italy is not considered an official source, but also there are press articles that go
more in depth and reveal where the sources come from, and others that are a lot vaguer in
their allegations and accusations. Again, an understanding of what has been said is part of an
informal check – informal as in “not formally sourced information”.
Then there is a certain level, quite important, which is an attempt to understand the
circumstances that pose somebody close to a problem: to give you an example, I might be the
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person that went bankrupt, and therefore, my name is all over the press; and you may have
been my chief accountant. A key question here is what was your role in the bankruptcy, if
you had any. That is purely a piece of information that could be critical in a company that is
considering doing business with you and would like to avoid any reputational fall out, for you
to be called the fraudster tomorrow. In this case, the informal source can be an interview with
you: it doesn’t have to be something exotic or something very complex; it can just be
bringing the person in and asking the straight question, but it is not going to be a formal
source, since it would be a matter of perception. Unless there has been an inquiry, and a
judge at the end making a final judgment, assessing your role in something would be
discretional.

I: The main criticism that law enforcement investigators make is that private corporate
investigation companies are posing as judges, without the guarantees of the law, speculating
allegations in an informal way, but that still have the same impact as formal allegations. What
is the issue with this policy and how can the two worlds match?

M.V.: First of all, when we are looking for evidence, we are bound by the same rules that
bind the police: that has to be clear. Any evidence that I may collect in the context of an
internal investigation, which then the company wants to produce in court is not valid if it
turns out that I have collected it not using the regular guarantees. So, it renders the job
completely pointless. This has to be made very clear.
It becomes very clear that we have less access in the course of conducting a corporate
investigation than law enforcement. Under certain circumstances, law enforcement can ask
for electronic payments, for example. This is entirely out of bound of private sector: there are
limits to what can be done within the menu. What can upset the police is that sometimes
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investigators - not Kroll - would use informal information gathering techniques, which are
illegal, to understand the results: maybe they hack into a private e-mail or listen to an
answering machine to try and find out whether someone is involved in something or not.
They may not be able to use that evidence in court, but it would help reducing the people that
are not involved, or identifying potential culprits; their idea is to get to the culprit first, and
then work backwards to prove it formally. This is not to be done: if found out it is very bad
practice, and it can undermine the work that has been collected legally; if anybody finds out
that their email has been hacked, the entire investigation will fall apart and the reputational
fall out for the company would be enormous. It is not only about whether it can be done or
not: it is about the fact that if you get caught, the entire thing collapses very badly.
Going back to what we were discussing earlier, since we started on compliance
checks: you are right, compliance checks are based on informal ways. When you conduct a
due diligence, which requires a reputation interview on the market this is not evidence, this is
opinion. This is purely opinion and this needs to be absolutely clear. The underlying principle
of this work, I think, and the reason why this is used as guidance, and only guidance, is that
usually markets understand their actors. People are not fools, and all you are doing in the
course of due diligence is collecting information that a lot of people in the market know; it
just has not been put together. For example, I know that you actually have nothing to do with
this case because I used to work next to you and the day you read the information on the
news, I heard you exclaim, “Ah! That’s what he was doing every night after 10 o’clock”. So,
I have a view and I have circumstantial evidence. You could have been very smart and done
this deliberately knowing that somebody else might come and in an interview people around
you trying to find out more; but there are ways. And if you worked for twenty years, there are
other people from previous employment that would have an opinion on how you work and
whether you were fair. The other thing is that you can take other elements of people’s
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behavior that may not have past performance and that may not pertain in this specific case to
form a broader picture.

I: What are the methodologies that Kroll uses to investigate a target company, to assess if it
raises red flags?

M.V.: In reality, the instruments are available to everybody, because what we do is collect
information that is in the public domain. This can be formal, like registries, or informal, like
the Internet; in certain circumstances we supplement this work by conducting interviews. The
art is the key here: it is not what tools you have, anyone can have those tools; there is no
proprietary special Kroll database. Kroll subscribes to a number of commercial databases
available, again available to anybody who wishes to subscribe to them. What one does is to
try and identify the famous red flags, and this is where the art comes in, because red flags are
not pre-determined: clearly if a law says that you are not allowed to conduct a certain type of
business if your company has been bankrupted in the last five years, and you are doing it, that
is a red flag; evidence of breaking the law is clearly a red flag.
Evidence of doing something to get around the law, is also a red flag, and a very
important one: you may see somebody who, for no good reason, will have an offshore
structure controlling a local entity in a country where this is not allowed. In these cases, you
are seeing potential evidence of somebody behaving improperly; he may not have been
caught, it may be difficult to prove, but you do get a sense that there may be something
wrong there.
The same applies with the pay structures. Some companies are very open in their
reporting, in their control structures, some companies are truly opaque. Anything opaque
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raises questions on why it is going on; there may sometimes be good reasons, but we need to
find them, and it still would be a preliminary red flag.
The third area of investigation, of course, depends on the specific business: if I am
looking at a company that is a mining company, I may be looking for its environmental
record. Whereas, if I am looking at a consulting services firm, its environmental record may
not be that important and I may not be looking for evidence that it is using underage labor to
deliver its services. I may be looking for that, instead, when I am looking at clothing
companies, for example.
The fourth and final area of investigation relates to how broad are the considerations:
you mentioned earlier human rights violations; while this can have legal implications, there
may be more specific reputational fall-outs to do with a particular mood of a particular time.
There was a time where we kept hearing about underage children working – making shoes or
clothing etc. - it has been a while that there haven’t been many of these scandals. I don’t
think it is because they have disappeared, or that it’s not happening: it is because we are
focusing on other areas. So, there may be a set of checks that one does regularly and there
may be a set of checks that are done either because it’s a particularly hot area or time, or
because of a client asks specifically for this.

I: Is there a geographic relativity over the way investigations are conducted and the
methodologies used?

M.V.: Yes, there is a huge difference from place to place, because there are so many local
factors that can affect risks. In Italy we know that certain areas, not just geographical, but
also economic, may be more targeted by organized crime more than others. As a result, the
investigation procedure will be looking for elements that might suggest the presence of
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organized crime in certain types of due diligence. In other countries, like in the Middle East,
you may be looking at government ties, tribal issues, ties to government and ruling families
for example, trying to understand whether you are dealing with something that will be
construed as a public sector company or not. There are cases in Spain where we will be
looking at financing of terrorist groups; we would not necessarily be doing this as a priority
in many Italian due diligence reports. If we are looking at the potential acquisition of a small
company producing ceramics, we will not be conducting a special investigation into terrorist
financing under normal circumstances: the territory will absolutely determine what the risks
are, and the local knowledge would also determine what to look at. I wouldn’t be in any
position today to go and conduct even a very basic due diligence in Dubai: I wouldn’t know
where to start.

I: Do you conduct geographic specific training programs for your workers or they are already
selected from different environments?

M.V.: A combination of the two things: for many territories we recruit locally for the
linguistic competence, but we will also hire people specifically looking at their expertise to
develop a particular area of a particular office. Also there are generalists, and there are large
offices, which work on different technical projects within a particular territory, therefore also
technical expertise may be necessary; cyber can be one of them.

I: How do the market projections affect the work of Kroll?

M.V.: The work can vary. I certainly saw an interesting development since the crisis in Italy:
when margin of loss become tighter, people become more interested in tightening controls.
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You may consider it normal to lose about five percent of your stock to petty theft or
whatever, if you are a company selling clothes; when things become complicated, you might
want to reduce that amount and you become much more careful at how it happens, and how
you can stop it.

I: Expanding on this, another kind of loss can be reputational exposure. One current hot topic
related to reputational exposure is the implementation whistleblowing policies. How do you
believe companies are respondent to the implementation of whistle blowing practices?
Implementing whistle blowing policies for a company means not only carrying out
investigations outside, but also investing its own company. What is the difference in the two
jobs?

M.V.: In whistle blowing, there are two things to consider: willingness, and local laws and
ability to conduct certain types of investigations. For example, the introduction of
whistleblowing legislation is very new to Italy; and about the willingness of the companies to
investigate these allegations I think it is too early to tell how quickly it is going to be
established and how systematic this might be. The way the legislation works is affording
protection and regulating the protection that can be granted. It doesn’t really incentivize
people or instruct companies to set out such sort of hotlines or other means. So, it is very
different for example from some of the American systems where people are encouraged to
blow the whistle and are even sort of rewarded for example for telling on certain types of
financial crimes. This is not what we have in Italy, and it is up to the private sector to
determine how much we are going to see in terms of investigative activities.
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I: Where do you see the anti-corrupt practices system to be in ten years? Is the system going
to merge private sector and public sector towards something that is more of a cooperative
relationship, or is it still going to be like today, where corporations do business and the public
sector does government?

M.V.: You raised a very good point. Technically speaking, the situation is already set-up:
private investigators in Italy, for example, have in their statute that they must cooperate with
the state. In fact, this bond is even stronger than this: they are not allowed to refuse
cooperation when requested, as it was always thought that they could be an extra arm. Now,
if they are competing on the same investigation, there is an issue, which has a lot to do with
the local mentality: in Italy, the typical attitude of the companies, the managers and the
lawyers I have spoken to, is that to avoid presenting the outcomes of their internal enquiries
to the public prosecutors during a judicial proceeding.
The true belief is that the prosecutor will assume that if they disclose this much, the
real problem is an order of magnitude greater than what is being disclosed, and they will dig
deeper and deeper. Therefore, it is much better to let them do their thing, because they are
going to do it anyway, and they may at the end of the day find what you would have found.
This is the problem: there is nothing in the Italian legislation that will allow a company to
avoid prosecution by self-policing and presenting the outcomes, and the moment you present
this kind of information to the public prosecutors, because of their lack of procedural
discretion they have to start an investigation. My understanding is that statutes in other
countries will allow you to conduct your internal investigations, present them under certain
conditions, and present the results and use them in parts to cooperate with the authorities and
find a settlement, which may even keep you entirely out of court.
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In Italy, there are no incentives in self-policing: I think because white-collar crime is a
very nasty beast and usually involve very good lawyers as well; it is very hard to get
convictions against prosecutions. Self-policing and finding some common solution would
avoid a lot of money of the tax payers, because at the end the corporations will have done the
job themselves. In Italy, as I said, it would involve massive changes in the statute, so I am not
sure how that would be possible.

I: Can we say that private investigators support the law enforcement activities for the
protection of security, though?

M.V.: A lot of what is in compliance involves security considerations. What in fact we are
doing by doing a simple check is stopping them in working with you. That alone is a massive
change between the past, where I could pretend I didn’t know somebody was a mafia, or I
didn’t know somebody was selling nuclear secrets. Clearly, though, what we are doing is
investigating corporate issues - fraud, bankruptcies. We are not out there to find out who is
selling nuclear secrets. That is not really what we do on a day-to-day basis. If you are a smart
investigator, in certain circumstances you may put together enough information to find out
something that is very relevant; interestingly, we have no obligation to disclose this to
anybody. By the way, I think that is right: I am not a policeman, and I am not afforded the
same degree of protection; if I go and spill the beans, I am dead. It is very, very serious to kill
a policeman, and everybody knows that. It is not very threatening to kill an investigator.

I: Source enquiries – what are they? How are they conducted? Who conducts them?
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M.V.: Source enquiries are interviews. The art is in identifying the right people. But the
interviews are just very standard interviews. In most countries they are conducted overtly,
including in Italy: you cannot lie about who you are, so they are conducted very openly. You
may not want to give away the entire background on what you are doing, or you may want to
keep your client’s name confidential, but you are quite openly interviewing people and
asking them to collaborate. You have to be persuasive and you have to be good at asking the
right questions and soliciting replies. The biggest part is identifying the right candidate and
getting them to speak to you.

I: How is this different from regular private investigations?

M.V.: In the Italian market, very few people actually conduct investigations from scratch, just
a few private investigations companies. They essentially do two things: they follow people,
often for marital disputes but also for business reasons, and this is surveillance; or, they try to
understand people’s track records and reputation, which is not really something that is done
at all, unless it is in a formal setting or a legal dispute. Within this, they conduct different
source enquiries, meaning that they use their network of sources that will provide you the
information that under normal circumstances is protected. Many times they offer something
that they shouldn’t, and you don’t want to do that.
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Annex II - Conducting corporate investigations in the Middle East
Interview with Tom Everett-Heath, Regional Managing Director for EMEA at Kroll
Associates, October 23, 2015

I: I am attempting to investigate the ties between international security, public policy making,
and corporate investigations. What I mean by this is that when you look at compliance
requirements, what you see is an extensive list of paperwork and forms to provide. In
addition to this, companies perform a number of checks that are not required by the law.
They are taken into account to make a better business. If I am a business involved in corrupt
practices, it is potentially less profitable than it was twenty years ago.

T.E.: You are addressing a very large and complicated question, and I will start by saying that
I share your cynicism. There are a bunch of imperatives which are not fully aligned from the
perspective of private sector business: on one hand you have various governments, various
jurisdictions who are invariably reacting to historic events and creating a regulatory
environment which imposes certain burdens on private sector actors with regards to how they
conduct their business. You can see their logic: the government says that there have been
scandals in the past about X; in turn, they say “we are going to change the law and we are
going to change the regulatory environment to make sure companies don’t do things which
allow X to happen again.” This approach is always basically reactive to previous events.
There is a long history there, particularly in the financial services sector, also relating
to bringing corruption charges against foreign officials and even private sector actors. You
have a government imperative to do this, which is by definition shaped around making laws and the minute you start making laws, you end up telling companies that they have to do
certain things. From the private sector perspective, you have got a very different imperative:
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on the one hand, you have your response to the regulatory environment, so there are things
that companies have to do to make sure that they are set up in a way such that their internal
processes and procedures don’t break the law (i.e.: banks have to do due diligence properly,
making sure they have got the correct paper work relating to politically exposed parties and
those that “extra” things). It is an exercise in making sure you are compliant with the law, and
it is a process.
You also have a completely different imperative, regarding how to do business well:
how does a company both, on one hand avoid negative risks that come from transacting in
certain ways with certain people, and one the other hand (and it is a positive thing and it gets
forgotten when it comes to the idea of investigation for information gathering), make sure
they are doing the best thing in the best way for themselves?
These imperatives are not always aligned. The latter imperative is very rarely aligned
with the regulatory environment the government sets up. If you add a further layer of
complexity, obviously you have the variations in the regulatory requirements in various
governmental jurisdictions, which sometimes are flatly contradictory. Other times they are set
at hurdle levels so low that there have never been cost implications to the business that is
actually threatened by the underlying risk factors. There are various tensions existing in our
current model.

I: What is the role of Kroll in this system?

T.E.: We have multiple roles within the system. Back to what we were talking about before
with regards to regulatory burdens at that the most simplistic level, we provide consulting
services to clients who are seeking to make sure that they are abiding by the regulatory
requirements of the jurisdictions in which they operate. For example, if you are a bank and
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you are on boarding a new client, there are certain pieces of information you are legally
required to have. Thus, we help those institutions, those clients, to gather that information
and to make sure that all is properly recorded in order to allow them to proceed to a
transactional relationship with their own clients. So we are consultants. You could think
about it being an outsourcing of a process that could probably be done internally by them
themselves, but we can - by dint of scale, expertise, and reach - do this more efficiently than
they could do themselves. Clients outsource their internal compliance obligations to us.
That is level one. And at the next level, we are the providers of consultant services
around the more private-sector-driven questions that evolve. Basically, we help companies to
manage their risks through a better understanding of the situation and the relationship they
are seeking to engage in by having a broader set of knowledge and information around that
before they make a decision. If you are a private equity firm looking at buying an asset in
Ghana, there are a lot of things you will need to know about what you are buying and the
environment in which the corporate entity operates; that, will not be easily or readily
available through disclosures, data rooms, or what your other advisers - be they lawyers or
whatnot - are going to tell you. So clients will come to us and say, “Kroll, here are a bunch of
questions, here are a bunch of things we need to understand”. Some of them could be as
simple as explaining the political environment in Ghana, or it could be explaining the policy
divisions in Ghana related to transactions; it could be detailing the competitive landscape, or
it could be helping in developing a deeper understanding of the track record, reputation, and
management of the asset they are buying; it could be explaining to them how there are
opportunities to buy longer-term acquisitions in neighboring jurisdictions to better leverage
the yield of what they are doing. It’s giving them a clearer line of sight on the broader
environment of transactions based on hard-to-acquire information and again allowing them to
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make better decisions. By understanding the jurisdictional barriers within as well, they will
be avoiding some risks.
In my opinion, the end result is that they have learnt very good things about the
structure of the business deal. For example, let’s say the government obtained a secured
contract that would allow them to discuss the deal differently to get a better return. So,
sometimes it is positive. It is about shining light in certain transactions allowing either a bad
deal to be avoided or a good deal to be done differently and better.

I: Since the shift in responsibilities for directing companies in avoiding corrupt practices has
moved from the state to the companies themselves, has the change made companies rely not
only on themselves, but also on Kroll for risk reduction?

T.E.: Yes, it has. It depends on the economic model we are starting in: if you are starting in
an aggressively capitalistic model, then you could argue that the risks sat with the private
sector entity fully. However, due to the danger of systematic damage, a number of
governments in aggressive capitalistic models have taken on the responsibility to impose
limitations in the form of regulations that will prevent reckless risk-taking by corporate
entities, which would be damaging for the broader economy and the society at large. So the
government is saying there are certain things that you have to do before you can conduct
certain transactions.
Depending on where you start, you could say the risk originally sat in the private
sector, but the government took a view that it also bears risk from a standard perspective. To
manage that risk effectively, they impose regulations to secure compliance as you described.
We don’t accept lies as a transfer of liability: we are offering intelligence, and it is up to the
client to decide on how they act on that. They can make bad decisions despite what we told
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them; it is up to them. It is not a full transfer of responsibility; it is a transfer of the
responsibility of gathering the intelligence in the first place, gathering the information and
processing and analyzing it.

I: Is the state giving up a responsibility, or does the state have another role in this picture,
being at the same time regulator, entrepreneur and client?

T.E.: Be careful: again, it depends on where you are in the world. If you are dealing in a
command economy, what the state is doing is subtler: it is imposing a regulatory obligation
or legal obligation onto the private sector and saying, “it is up to you how you discharge your
responsibility, up to you how you manage this process: if you want to do this, you can; if you
want to use external consultant like Kroll, you can; but it is your job as a private sector to
abide by the higher or aggressive hurdles of regulations around how you do business. Go do
it yourself however you want, but it is your job to make sure you do it right; if you don’t, we
will fine or jail you”.

I: Since an economy like the UAE, which was ranked one of the cleanest countries in the
world by Transparency International, may be using a different model, does one need an
United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) modeled law to regulate malicious
business behavior?

T.E.: The FCPA is a widely studied thing: the way it is used now, and the way the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in the United States (US) uses it now, have evolved enormously
over the last thirty years. If you really want my cynical view, this has become a tool for the
extension of US interference on one level: it is saying “this is our concept of practice and we
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are imposing this on the rest of the world”. On a very cynical level, it has become a profit
center for the US government: you look at the size of the fines imposed by the DOJ in
settlements and it is very hard to imagine they are not making considerable profits.
Depending on the tracked information, you can see the scale of the fines imposed on certain
banks for regulatory breaches: they are eye-wateringly large. Such fines are in no way
reflecting the cost of government with regards to the regulatory framework. But that is a
sidetrack I am being drawn down which I probably should avoid.

I: Do you believe that anti-corrupt practices legislation is and can be a form of foreign
policy?

T.E.: Yes, I think there is no doubt about it at all. You mentioned Transparency International
in the UAE, and there is an important point that you need to understand about it: the index
they produce has a really important word that gets glossed over and neglected. The specific
term is the “perception of corruption index”, not “corruption index”. This is a very important
distinction because firstly it is impossible to measure corruption: I can’t give you a
percentage, but I can tell you that most corruption is never detected, and therefore, you can’t
measure it.

I: Would you say that that index is really reliably indicative of the reality of things be it
related to the UAE or the Middle East, even if not all the countries are involved?

T.E.: Really, not at all. In fact, it actively makes a mess of it. Because, by dint of being a
perception of corruption index, it is based upon the perceptions of the respondents to the
surveys upon which the index is based. In my experience, India is one of the truly most
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endemically corrupt countries in the world; so endemic is the concept of corruption in India,
that there are many aspects of corruption that are not considered as corrupt in India. If you
look at the index, India comes out in the thirties-something, and there are many countries that
are below India on that list of perception of corruption that are far less endemically corrupt
than India. Basically, India is so corrupt that you don’t think it is corruption in India. This, to
me, very much undermines the usefulness of the Transparency International index. I’m not
saying I have got a better idea, don’t get me wrong: I don’t know how you can produce a
corruption index, but I have been doing this job for more than ten years: we investigate
corruption and I see where we do so; we do a lot of due diligence and we do a lot of research,
and it is entirely anecdotal.

I: Does this put into jeopardy the idea of evolution of the law or of avoiding the corruption if
it is not measurable?

T.E.: I guess. I suppose the issue is that I have a problem on ranking this sort of things: I
think the approach - if there is a unified approach to take at all - is that first principle: is
corruption bad? The answer “yes” is not necessarily for the reason people think it is bad: it is
presented by some governments as being some sort of moral absolute bad thing. By
definition, that is not absolute, that’s subjective, and it will vary from wherever you are in the
world to wherever else you are in the world.
The problem with corruption is that within a capitalistic model it actually leads to bad
allocation of resources and it creates systematic risks, which are bad for the country: this is a
good reason to fight corruption. If you know that, to a lower level it actually ends up being a
very inefficient way of running a business: if you are a contractor working in various
jurisdictions and you are constantly paying bribes to secure contracts, this is bad economics;
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it is bad for you as a contractor and it is bad for the country and the entity of contracting
wing. They, by definition, will see a lot of leakage in economic benefits from both the
buyer’s and the seller’s side. It gets wrapped up in a moral claim, which is potentially quite
distorting as it presents corruption as being an absolute bad. It is not an absolute bad.

I: Is corruption necessarily wrong, as some schools of thought say, or does it affect economic
growth only in certain economic systems?

T.E.: Corruption is always inefficient: it leads to bad decision making about the allocation of
resources in the ordering of contracts. It is always a bad thing in that sense.

I: In addition to your experience of being in Eastern Europe during the political transition,
you have also worked in the Middle East for nearly twenty years. How are informal
investigations affected by social-political situations and the general public approach to the
private sector?

T.E.: These observations are based on what clients say to me, and there is no academic
research basis. The starting point is the regulatory requirement, meaning what you have
identified or not in relation to national businesses and their compliance requirements.
Clients are constantly trying to work out what is their regulatory requirement, because
they have various levels of jurisdictional exposure. You can have, for example, a European
entity based in Italy, that has sufficient jurisdictional footprint in the United Kingdom (UK)
and the US and is conducting a transaction in Egypt: the first thing that company would do is
assessing internally what is the highest regulatory threshold that they need to satisfy out of all
of the various authorities they are subject to. It is not an easy task: in this example the Italian
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company would be subject to Italian law, but also to EU law; the US footprint makes it
subject to the FCPA obligations, and they have the UK footprint which makes it subject to
the Bribery Act (UKBA), which is the most aggressive of all the legislations. They also have
to worry about the Egyptian law as well when operating in Egypt.
Out of that set, probably the Bribery Act is going to be the most onerous in terms of
making sure they have done their due diligence effectively and paid off their regulatory
obligations. Their first question will be probably about that, the regulatory environment. For
a good sensible private sector this would be quite easily done, as it is built into its processes
and systems, and it just wants to make sure that they are compliant with the highest threshold
of regulatory intrusion.
The next question of a client is how to get enough information to allow him to make
primarily a decision whether there are other risks that sit beyond those thresholds, which
could create either a significant financial or reputational or legal liability. There are many
things that could go wrong that are not covered off by those regulatory obligations: often
companies don’t worry about that, but they should. When we look at a deal in a market that
would simply go well, we best gather the information we need to make a good decision about
how we shape instruction for these transactions. We understand what information do we
need, how can we legally gather that information, and how can we feed that into what we
think about the deal as a whole.

I: In your 2013 talk at Cairo’s Euromoney Conference, you discussed the “perception gap”,
which is the difference between perceived risk and real risk, and how the media influences
that gap. How does Kroll conduct reputational analysis or risk assessment in the Middle East
if the media is unreliable?
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T.E.: The media always serves “a” purpose; but it is not “the” purpose. I use the word
“media” with a small “m” and in the broadest possible sense. Let’s stick with the Egyptian
example: in doing a reputational analysis, by definition you have to have a good look at the
extent to which your subject has a profile in the English and Arabic language press; you will
look at the social media sites; you will look at blog sites commentary; you will look for extra
starting points for a profile built on the subject. It is going to get you sometimes somewhere often nowhere - and you cannot rely on what is in the media to be regarded as being
absolutely true or comprehensive, but we could have a long conversation on the problems of
the media in the Arab world. You will gather what you could do regardless of the public
domain footprint.
For a starting point, there will often be contradictions in the media profile, and there
will often be big gaps, lack of explanation of events; you have to factor into that the
motivation of individual journalists and the media that are publishing various forms of
opinion that you are citing in this profile. And you have to cross-reference them. So there is
no shortage of examples of people, who have negative media profiles, but those negative
profiles on deeper examination and analysis appear made simply to damage certain actors and
this is part of your report back to the client. It is a complicated equation, because on one hand
we have had projects in which we reported to clients an intervention that there are a number
of allegations of wrongdoing against the subject, and we have gone on to say that we had
investigated these more deeply and we thought we could explain why those allegations had
been made, as we had other reasons to believe that actually the allegations were false. That
doesn’t actually necessarily solve the client’s problem, because if there is negative
commentary - negative noise - around a potential counterparty, even if it is not true, it doesn’t
mean it is not going to be damaging for the business.
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So you have to address that level of opportunity, therefore you go beyond the media,
into human source enquiries: we have networks of people, and we look to develop what we
call “human source intelligence”, that hopefully goes deeper into the issues raised in the
public domain. Often, particularly in the Middle East, it also identifies issues that have never
been reported in the media - and frankly, never will be reported in the media - and seeks to
explain them too. We have to be often careful to report and how we explain this to our
clients, since usually we are not in a situation where we can prove out what these sources are
telling us: we are reporting to our clients what people are telling us; we are not often in a
position to say with any definitive legal certainty that what we are reporting can be regarded
as fact. These facts are not being tested or caught, and actually in the Middle East there are a
number of jurisdictions where it will be dangerous to actually rely upon judicial proceeding
thinking that it has been accurate, as these themselves are open to influence and corruption.
So you are dealing with derivatives of derivatives. What we are seeking to do is to try and get
a cross reference and fill that into an understanding which will allow our clients to make
more educated decision.

I: What other tools would you say are different between the Middle East and Europe?

T.E.: There are a whole bunch of differences: if you take the broad palette of information
sources available, you have everything from media stuff, to corporate record stuff; you have
litigation histories, and within the litigation history, depending on where you are in the world,
there are greater or lesser riches of information that can be gathered. With a computer and a
name and a social security number in the US, vast amounts of information could be gathered.
You can sit down and try this in Syria, for example, and you will know the square root of
nothing by doing that.
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The major difference is in what we can easily call public record: court filing,
corporate registry information, literal goals, residential address information, and all this sort
of stuff. In some jurisdictions, if a person wants to change that information, they can change
it. In other jurisdictions, like in Western Europe, you can’t change that; you can’t decide that
your conviction for fraud never happened once you have it removed; you can’t go back in
and have corporate registry data all sorted because you have a friend in the ministry who can
remove your name from the ownership of the business. In some jurisdictions you can, and
that is part of the process of triangulating and cross-balancing your information: you are
trying to get multiple source points, multiple touch points of information that would allow
you to build up a picture that won’t be complete, but with a lot of cross references you can
get some concepts that, in the end, are reliable.

I: Is source enquiry the crucial tool for due diligence in the Middle East?

T.E.: It’s a very important part of enquiry, but it comes with some problems, too. You have to
understand the motivation of people you are talking to: if they really do have access to certain
information you want, they’ve got to give it to you reliably, and why would they ever do
that? Source enquiries do play a far more important role. A general observation, a sound
observation, is that in Western Europe information is institutionalized: there are processes;
there are structures. If you go into the Middle East, information is general observation;
information intelligence sits with individuals. Individuals are more important than
institutions, and it is a key distinction about how we go about the work we do.

I: What are Middle Eastern companies’ best practices for gathering information, be it for the
law or marketing purposes?
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T.E.: I will back up and give you an answer to a different question first, then I will come to
that. So in terms of differences, what you see really can be shaped by who is asking the
question and why.
Western businesses’ starting point for the requests of information is usually around a
regulatory compliance driven requirement: it is often a lot narrower, process-oriented thing.
Then the most sophisticated questions get bolted on top of that regulatory requirement for
information. And as a result they are often confused in their objectives, because one is the
regulatory and the other one is good intelligence around the deal, which are actually different
things.
A different thing is dealing with multi-national business active in the Middle East,
since you have this tension that exists between the core and the periphery: the head office,
which might be in New York, London or wherever, has got its outside view of operations in
the region of the Middle East. Local management in the region will have a different set of
issues in its head, but it is still having its decision-making shaped by the ability to explain
stuff to the corporate core, which sits outside the region. We are often used to help bridge that
gap that exists between those two issues.
To get back to your direct question, one of the things that is interesting is that because
there is a considerably lighter domestic and cultural regulatory set of obligations composed
on indigenous companies in the Middle East, when they come to us, they are usually coming
to us not because of their regulatory obligations, but actually because they genuinely want to
know, because they are trying to do a good deal. They are trying to make money; they are
trying to deal with the right people; they are trying to maximize the benefits for them in
structuring a deal well.
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I: I do see that. As far as security-related checks on companies, do those businesses in the
Middle East are more stringent because of threats of terrorism or individuals’ ties to radical
groups?

T.E.: This is a good question, and the answer is more nuanced than you might expect. When
multi-national companies ask those questions, they are usually asking them actually from the
regulatory perspective, as you correctly have identified. In a way that I find surprising
sometimes, they are happy with a “public record” answer. Therefore, what they are actually
asking is if anybody has reported their counter-party as being involved in terrorist financing
or money laundering or things like that: if there is no media report, they are not being tried,
and they are not on the sanctions watch list, then the answer is ”okay, on we go”. They are
not asking themselves if these subjects have actually been involved in this sort of stuff in a
way that has not yet been reported, and they tend to have quite a low barrier for concern
around that.
Within the Middle East, indigenous clients – since they have a natural understanding
of the limitation of the public records - when they do want to know, they really want to know;
they are far more likely to commission us to conduct far more detailed and intense
investigative methodologies to answer those questions, because they actually want to know.
They don’t want to know if it has been reported: they want to know if the counter-party is
actually involved in terrorist financing, and so they want us to dive deeper and be more
rigorous in addressing those questions than an international counter-part.

I: It is fascinating how culturally relative this aspect is. Do Middle Eastern businesses really
want to know this because they do not want to deal with that particular world even if that
means losing money or not getting the deal through?
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T.E.: Yes, but that also feeds back to bad economics, because the last thing you want to tell
them is to join a $200 million joint venture only to discover six months later that the
counterparty is actually on the watch list. That is a really bad piece of economics, because
you won’t have any business left. But I think they do have a better natural understanding of
the limitations of the public records, because they live in a world where public record is
limited and they understand their instincts, and so they tend to ask better and more detailed
questions.

I: Let’s consider how the Eastern part of the world, with countries like China and Iran, is
being push and pulled by international relations and foreign policy developments. How do
these dynamics affect businesses? Are they going to be westernized even if the public sector
is not westernized? Will these new dynamics capitalize the business even if the governments
are not capitalized? In the UAE we saw that, but what about the rest of the Middle East?

T.E.: It is an interesting question, and there is no simple answer. I mean, underpinning any
attempt to the answer is the reality of the globalization of trade, and also the dollarization of
trade. You can call it neo-imperialism or what you want, but this does give Western
jurisdictions an ability to export their regulatory environments: if you are doing your deals in
dollars, dollars get traded to New York; that is recourse to your authorities. America is still
the largest economy in the world; Western Europe still produces a considerable amount of the
cutting edge and technologically and heavy industry and market. These are big markets, and
if you want to play in those markets, or if you are dealing with dollars and euros to a lesser
extent, then you are going to get sucked into the regulatory world created in Western Europe,
and that is very hard to avoid.
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The flip side of that is, of course, that the rise of the Asian economies and their ability
to project their economic firepower into the emerging markets - particularly Africa and the
Middle East - is changing the nature of that balance. You can’t as a country choose the East
and reject the West: it is not as simple as that, because there is still great reliance on both the
markets for source technology and capital, and it cannot be avoided. So, if your question is
who is going to win that cultural war, the answer is nobody. It is going to get involved in an
ever-more complicated dance for the people who are trying to play both sides of the equation.

I: Do you feel there are certain things that just can’t be globalized about the Middle East,
about the culture and the people?

T.E.: Absolutely! This is in itself an oversimplification of a very complicated thing. I think of
it as a triangle with three points: Western geopolitical-economic influence on the
development of the states; the influence by China and the other eastern economies; and the
indigenous environment you are describing. What has changed in the last twenty years, in my
perspective, is that the points of that triangle have moved, and the triangle changed its shape,
but all the inputs are important. You could add more points and stop it being a triangle and
become a rectangle if you start thinking about Russia’s reengagements in the Middle East and
all different sorts of factors that are neither Eastern nor Western nor indigenous, but actually
of growing importance. Yet what you have is the area contained within the triangle,
rectangle, have it what you want to have: it changes shape as those points move; they are all
mutually influencing each other. I don’t think that is going to be any different twenty years
from now than what twenty years ago: there will be external influences; there will be
indigenous influences, and all that you have is a change in this Euclidean chain.
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I: What is your view on where all this is going and on where the relationship between the
foreign policy and corporate policy control is going?

T.E.: I think one of the things worth remembering, and I find it the most interesting part, is an
obvious thing: the government is a very slow moving elephant; the private sector is always
more nimble. That nimbleness is expressed both on the good side and the bad side: most
private sector businesses are usually more sophisticated than the governments that are
seeking to regulate and make them do things; they are usually ahead of what the government
is trying to get them to do. The corollary of that is, of course, that the people who are the
negative forces in this equation - the people who are involved in money laundering and
terrorist financing and corruption and fraud - they are also fast-moving and faster-moving
than the government; they will adapt their practices and they will adapt their approaches, and
they will be again above and beyond and outside in their operations most of the time.
Government moves slowly, but the positive forces of the private sector and the negative
forces of - let’s loosely call them - criminals, are fast-moving and nimble and freer. As the
process advances, the government is always catching up, it is never ahead of. That is the
important thing to remember.
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Annex III - Compliance and Public Policy
Interview with Kevin Braine, Managing Director and Head of Compliance, EMEA, at Kroll
Associates, October 22, 2015

I: Why are corporate investigation companies needed?

K.B.: There are three main reasons why corporate investigations companies provide a much
needed standalone service to businesses.
The first is wanted expertise. It’s not practical for any company, aside from perhaps the very
biggest of organizations, to employ a large team of experts just in case they have to deal with
situations, which hopefully won’t occur very often in the life cycle of a normal company. For
most businesses it’s just too expensive to employ in-house expertise. If they do this they are
essentially paying to have a constant ability to react to, investigate and monitor what are
essentially extraordinary “black swan” type events where they probably won’t – and
shouldn’t - be affected either now, or in the foreseeable future.
The second thing that gives our industry its raison d’être, is the fact that most
companies want a second objective independent opinion. Sometimes a company can be faced
with real or even alleged adverse behavior; it could be corruption, it could be anticompetition, it could be fraud, it could even be something that is not a criminal or legal issue
but just deeply embarrassing to them. In these cases they often need to satisfy their
shareholders, both politically and internally, so they would like to have a totally objective
third party look at the problem for them.
Sometime it’s just a “belts and braces” effect. It’s either to support or disprove the
conclusions that their internal company risk team might have reached. In many cases, the
internal teams are actually desperate to outsource this to an objective third party, because
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what they might have been asked to look at is too much of a political “hot potato” within
their own organization. There might be too much commercial pressure, or general pressure
from the rest of the business to ensure the investigation reaches a certain outcome. It is much
easier for an external party to come in and point to failures, rather than it is for an internal
department that probably cohabits with the people who may have done something wrong.
The last aspect is regulatory pressure. The regulators have piled on the responsibility
for companies to comply, and to show that they are working hard to comply, with a whole set
of regulatory requirements. In many cases, it is actually written explicitly into the guidelines
in the UK Bribery Act (UKBA): you can only comply if you use an objective and credible
third party; it doesn’t matter if you have a fantastic team who is able to investigate and
conduct due diligence on your behalf internally. In some instances, the regulators will say
that to be truly effective the investigation should have been carried out by a third party.
These are the three main strands that give investigative firms and consultancies a reason for
being.

I: Even though we know that laws such as the UKBA and even the US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) enforce the need for third party interventions, do you think it’s fair to
ask normal sized companies to make these, sometime expensive, investigations?

K.B.: A lot of national and supra-national anti-bribery and anti-corruption type legislations
and regulations actually introduce, or even stipulate, the principle of proportionality. Here we
can cite the UKBA again, mainly because it is one of the most recent legislations.
There is an understanding that small-medium enterprises (SME) will just not be able
to conduct the same levels of checks and compliances as a regulated financial institution or a
larger listed entity of a certain size and scale. There is also a concept of proportionality when
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it comes to the amount of work that you need to do to satisfy a regulator, to at least show you
have tried. In principle, you are not expected to do that much due diligence or extra research
and investigative work for relationships which you can justify as low risk, according to a
logical set of criteria.
This introduces another key concept, both within the FCPA and the UKBA (and in
some of the Italian legislations as well), that is the concept of risk assessment. It doesn’t
matter what you do, but you have to be able to demonstrate that there was a logic to your
approach. Should the regulator knock on your door and say: “Why did you start working with
Mr. Di Pietro, but only conduct these levels of checks on him”? If the answer is “Because
Mr. Di Pietro fit nicely in this risk assessment, which meant that according to our process we
only had to verify his identity and do some basic Know Your Customer (KYC), which we did
through the contracting process and we didn’t see the need to do anything else” then that is
the type of response that the UK regulator, for example, might consider as being a
demonstration of adequate procedures.

I: I remember an interview where you stated exactly that, about the Kroll’s Third-Party Risk
Assessor, when you said that every company needs to assess which level of due diligence to
apply in each specific case.

K.B.: To reiterate, every time new regulatory requirements are introduced you will get
industry associations crying out that this is going to make their sector or their industry
uncompetitive. You will have business leaders going on the record to complain that it is a
burden on them and on some smaller players. In truth, there has been an associated cost to the
type of regulation we are talking about that has grown steadily over the last fifteen years. If
you go back fifteen or twenty years, you would find that the average Italian manufacturing
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company, who is maybe operating only regionally and who is below a certain size, wouldn’t
feel the need to have a full time senior employee wearing a specific “risk management hat”. It
wouldn’t need to employ a couple of people to administer new processes that are driven
purely by regulatory requirements.
Finally, there is an additional cost but the industry, that has developed over the last
twenty or thirty years, around this consulting servicing, has developed specifically because it
is a more efficient way of managing that cost.

I: When I think about Kroll’s Third Party Risk Assessor from an academic perspective I see a
need for uniformity in the definition risk, and as concerns the criteria of which level to apply
to what risk and what level of due diligence to apply to which case. Does this indicate a lack
of clear criteria in the regulatory system, or is it just a way to make it cheaper and simpler for
the final user?

K.B.: I think it is a bit of both. Every compliance officer you might speak to will complain
about the fact that there are still no clearly accepted standards, which regulators will commit
to. They won’t say “If you do this, in this manner, we will consider that you are compliant”.
It is very much left to individual companies to decide how much they have to do, what they
have to do and in most countries they have to rely on principles rather than guidelines. Again
this is mainly for anti-bribery and anti-corruption type legislations.

I: You said that another reason corporate investigation companies exist is to provide a second
objective opinion. Because corruption and bribery affect the system, shouldn’t it be the role
of the judiciary or the police to investigate it, instead of shifting the responsibilities to
companies?
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K.B.: In principle, absolutely, however in practical terms, most law enforcement agencies and
judiciaries simply don’t have the capacity to look at everything. A great deal of the work that
is generated by the regulations is actually work trying to identify potential failures or to
trying to prevent a company getting into a situation where it might be non-compliant. Those
agencies are not interested in people coming to them to ask them to arbitrate on matters
which turn out, in the end, to be non-controversial or absolutely fine and compliant.
What does happen, sometimes, is that in some cases, in order to get the judiciary
interested in considering whether to not to take action, there is quite a strong onus put on
corporate entities to present a nicely researched and pre-packaged file as a starting point,
essentially to get regulators “out of bed”. That is one if the things that our work is used for.
There is a massive resource issue, whether it’s in Italy or France or Germany. Even in
the US, which arguably has a better structure for providing more resources and has
enforcement arms that have more “teeth”, they have to be highly selective about the matters
they get involved in. They’ll tend to only pick and run with cases where they feel confident
of a clear, definite and relatively easy win.

I: Depending on the culture you’ll find different policies for investigation firms in each
country with different laws governing them. How can a policy about investigation firms, and
their involvement with legislation and the authorities, establish a balance between private
interests and public interests, and be a reflection of these interests too?

K.B.: This is a good question and I don’t think there is a right or wrong answer. Let me give
you an example instead.
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For the past five years, the Serious Fraud Office in the UK has gone out of its way to adopt a
more American attitude and to strongly broadcast the message: “If you spot something wrong
as a firm or as an advisory firm working with one of your clients, come to us first and
disclose it, collaborate and it will make everything far better in the long run”.
Then, in March, there was a change in personnel. A new head of regulatory
enforcement started at the Serious Fraud Office. His first public act was to address a large
cross-section of 250 legal counsels and compliance offices and to tell them that from that
moment, on the minute they saw a problem they weren’t to do anything at all, but rather they
were to disclose everything to the Serious Fraud Office. He said they should not attempt to
look into the problem further themselves. In fact, he urged them to come to the Serious Fraud
Office even if they only had a suspicion that something might be wrong. He further stated
that if they started looking into the problem themselves, or if they asked their advisors to start
looking at it on their behalf, the Serious Fraud Office would consider that to be an obstruction
of justice and the counsel or compliance officer may be considered to have contaminated
what the Serious Fraud Office would view as a crime scene.
This is a complete overnight change in tone from an agency where the rules and the
guidelines haven’t actually changed. However, its suddenly gone from a possibly over
optimistic “let’s all work together” type of attitude to a new and very strong message sent out
saying from now on we are the “be all and end all” and you can’t do anything yourself. The
end reaction, I suspect, was cooperation with law enforcement, both from investigative firms
and from our clients. Ultimately we’ll encourage our clients to cooperate or to disclose if we
come across things, which is we think ought to be flagged to the authorities. But we can’t
make them do it.

I: Was business itself affected by this new attitude?
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K.B.: So far, no. I think it has been viewed as posturing essentially by individuals rather than
a significantly change in the regulatory environment.

I: Yes. I suppose there are procedures that change depending on the policy, for example
different legal limitations and so on.

K.B.: There are licensing requirements for investigative work in some countries. For
example, in Italy or in France, you have to be a licensed agent de recherche to do certain
types of investigative work. The rules are very different from country to country. I think that
what is key here, and this really does affect all investigative work no matter who does it, is
whether it’s done in house or by a company like Kroll, is the ever-shifting quicksand that is
privacy laws.

I: I know that Kroll’s London office deals with the compliance frameworks that are used in
the rest of Europe and the Middle East. Where do these compliance frameworks come from?

K.B.: We work on many levels. On one hand, we are a global organization, so we rely on a
global set of policies and procedures that are rolled out across the whole firm. We try to make
these as all-encompassing as possible. Of course that still means that from country to country,
we adopt rules and regulations that might not be relevant locally, but that we adopt
voluntarily. As an example we might subscribe to stricter rules, simply because they are
applicable in the US. So we take on that burden here in the UK even though, according to UK
law, a UK incorporated entity wouldn’t necessarily have to apply them. Similarly when it
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comes to things such as privacy and human rights, we fall back on the principles of European
wide legislation.
For some specific things that are very relevant to our work, such as data protection,
we work on the basis that by being UK data protection compliant, we are broadly-speaking
compliant. The fact that the UK Data Protection Act (UKDPA) is based on a European
convention that is meant to be replicated across every country means we can say that if we
are compliant here and that if we stick to the same rules across Europe, we will be compliant
there also. Realistically speaking, in places such as Germany or France, we go beyond the
UK requirements because those countries are stricter in their interpretation of the same
European guidelines. What is throwing a massive spanner in the works at the moment is the
recent challenge to the safe harbor rules that are, essentially, the way that most companies
regulate their data exchanges with the United States in particular.
At the moment, the whole of Kroll is fully compliant with some specific US
sanctions, in particular against Iran or let’s say, Cuba. These sanction rules are much stricter
than those of the FCPA itself or the Italian or French or British or even EU sanctions. We try
to stick to global standards wherever possible; we have some regional variations, because we
have to, but we try to keep them to a minimum.

I: Besides the compliance requirements imposed by the law, what are those elements of
Kroll’s compliance policies or framework parts that are not formally included in the law, but
you have included because you consider them best practice and/or convenient for the clients?

K.B.: There are a number and, although it’s slightly off topic, I will say that one more recent
development is that we are seeing compliance being viewed suddenly as a competitive
advantage. To give you some basic examples, we are now seeing that large fast-moving
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consumer goods (FMCG) companies, for example, are pushing their compliance program and
their ability to stay on top of best practices, when it comes to regulatory requirements, as a
way to become more attractive to their customers or to their shareholders.
As for Kroll, and this is true for most investigative firms, and Kroll is no absolutely
no exception here because of the business that we are in, we actually go out of our way to
reassure clients that by working with us you are working with an organization that will do its
utmost to stay on the right side of any of the applicable legislations. In many instances our
clients hire us to safeguard their reputation, in some way or another. If we did anything that
could be construed as unethical, we become a risk to our clients’ reputation; they are very
cynical about it and look at it just in terms of commercial impact, so that would be disastrous.
That goes way beyond the risk or having a slap on the wrist from the regulator or being fined:
it would be a brand destroying exercise for us. We see a lot of companies beginning to take
that on board, and treating compliance not just as an obligation to keep the regulators happy,
but a competitive advantage, that helps build consumer confidence essentially.

I: So, if I have understood this correctly: although the public sector gave the private sector a
new responsibility that could have been considered a burden, the private sector itself is now
promoting this new responsibility of self-compliance and it is regulating itself in a new
market of compliance. Is that correct?

K.B.: Yes. They are doing it because, ultimately, if you look at it from a very commercial
point of view, when a company has an obligation to do all sorts of things and to set up
controls and processes, to spend time and effort and sometimes a considerable amount of
budget, in order to be as compliant as possible, they have realized they would get a better
return on their investment if they use that, not just to keep the regulator happy, but to
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advertise themselves as a better company to work with or work for, or to purchase products
from.

I: I’d like to revisit the geo-economic aspects of Kroll’s business. For example Kroll has a
very different role in Italy where we have a, hopefully temporary, crisis of decline in the
economy the UAE where you have a rising economy. In a crisis market, clients are more
careful with investments, so they hire Kroll to manage their risks better. In a climbing
market, Kroll becomes more of a business intelligence firm that works on the
competitiveness of companies. Is this a fair description?

K.B.: I think you have described it very well. We have a skill set that, thankfully, is relatively
protected against boom and bust cycles, general economic boom and bust cycles.
As you quite rightly pointed out, part of our business is driven by the appetite of firms
to grow and expand into new markets, to develop new relationships. They ask companies like
Kroll to screen these relationships for potential issues. These are things that you will see in a
boom cycle, either for a sector or an economy or a region; increased activity, more M&A,
companies expanding into new sectors, going into new countries, developing new lines.
In a sort of economic contraction phase, you suddenly see much more demand for
more defensive types of investigative services. To give you another example, if you take the
private equity sector of about ten years ago, the margin and the amount of financial
engineering that was possible back in those days, meant that a successful private equity firm
could essentially make ten investments in a year, have four succeed and the rest flop horribly
and make still an extremely good return for its partners or employees and shareholders. Fastforward ten years and the same company, investing in the social same sectors, would
probably find that the financial engineering options are much more limited. So now, in order
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to make money, they need to generate real growth in their portfolio companies, and their
margins are much, much, much slimmer. It is much harder to get a return on an investment.
This means that if you are only making ten investments a year, you need to make damn sure
of that at least eight of them will break even, if not grow, otherwise your whole business
model is threatened. That’s the defensive mindset that means where they might have been
happy to operate where there were much higher potential risks, there is a lot more work being
done upfront now to highlight things that might go wrong.

I: Are there checks that you believe are required in one place or another in the EMEA region
concerning security and human rights?

K.B.: Yes: for a start there are specific human rights legislations that have come in that are
forcing companies to think a lot more about human rights and criminal exploitation of labor,
in particular; not just in their enterprises, but in their supply chain. That makes some
industries quite vulnerable. If you are a company that essentially relies on either a product or
a service that is produced by third parties on your behalf, and by using some sort of very low
skilled, low paid sort of labor intensive situation, for example agriculture, then you have a
real risk from a human rights point of view.
Anybody who is buying, let’s say, cotton from Turkmenistan, or yellow cake from
Mali, or shrimp from Thailand, is potentially exposed. They have a very real security risk
because most of the shrimp fishing industry in Thailand is essentially manned by Burmese
slave labor. Additionally the working conditions of people picking cotton in Turkmenistan is
known to be atrocious. Mali is one of the few countries in the world where you can actually
legally own another person. Although slavery is not on their statute books, you can be born a
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slave in Mali and it’s not illegal in the strict terms of local law, and it’s also absolutely
common practice in most of the country.
So these are thoughts and risks that companies actually react to now, much like the
sort of obligations companies have when it comes to corruption and bribery. You can’t let
somebody do it on your behalf: you are responsible if you benefit from the act. There is a lot
more emphasis and a lot more legislation coming into place now to say that you can’t just
buy things, goods or services from people who are doing things that you wouldn’t do
yourself. If you do, and you haven’t looked into it, you will be held responsible. I think this is
a sensible and good thing, especially in a world where the supply chain is becoming more
global and it’s much harder to have visibility over where the actual goods come from; where
your shoes are actually made or your shirt is being stitched or your cotton is being picked,
and that sort of thing.

I: When it comes to security issues, are any kinds of security related checks that are not
formally included today, but that should be?

K.B.: I think one of the things to consider is international sanctions. If you are in Turkey,
there is nothing wrong for a Turkish company selling goods and services to Iran. In fact,
Turkey is Iran’s largest foreign partner. If you are in the US and you are planning to do
exactly the same thing, it is illegal and it is a criminal offence. There are lots of regional
variations.

I: I can’t decide myself where these security specific checks should belong. I see that if a
company can’t do something they just outsource the task to a company that can do it for

	
  

112	
  

	
  

them. So, should these checks belong to the formal side of checks of compliance or to the
informal side?

K.B.: It’s essentially a very difficult question. Different organizations will try to tackle this in
different ways.
One of the things that is really worth remembering is the fact that compliance and the
extent to which a company tries, or doesn’t try, to be compliant with national or international
legislation, formal rules or informal best practices, is essentially down to each individual
company’s risk appetite. That risk appetite will change over time. So you could argue, just
again to come up with a practical example, that the real estate investments arms of big
financial services firms in Europe, about ten years ago, had a phenomenal risk appetite. They
were going right, left and center and financing extremely high-risk real-estate projects. Real
estate was a winner every time. Everyone was making money and no country was too risky,
no type of transaction was too risky. After the shock of the financial crisis, these very same
entities, these very same departments within the big banks, became incredibly risk aversive.
So they now apply an extremely conservative reading of legislation which hasn’t changed at
all, and which in their most bullish days they would have said “we are willing to stretch our
interpretation of this particular legal requirement and so we will go ahead with this
transaction”, whereas now the minute it becomes a grey area they might just say no straight
away.

I: What you are suggesting, if I get it right, is that it’s not the company that should change its
policies, but it’s the regulations that should cause the change in companies.

K.B.: Yes.
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I: So, it’s 2015 but anti-corruption and bribery regulations are still from the beginning of the
1970s, well, the big ones. Where do you think the regulations should go?

K.B.: I think you have a relatively pessimistic view on things, in this instance. Looking
backwards, again in a very broad and a very general manner, the first anti-corruption law
really came about in the Seventies. There was no enforcement at all until the Eighties, and
even then not very much, when it was only US driven. Now fast-forward to 2015, where
China, Russia, Nigeria, France, Italy and the UK have all upgraded their legislations to try to
tackle corruption.
There are countries which had no enforcement at all five years ago, that suddenly
have regulators and enforcement agencies that are funded, motivated and beginning to have a
little bit of success. In places like Denmark and Hungary there has been a lot of progress
made. The general public is a lot more sensitive to these issues that it was.
Back in the early Eighties nobody really cared about how the UK managed to sell $3.4 billion
worth of arms to the Saudis. Nowadays that particular arms deal is still being debated and
viewed in a much more critical way. The UN highlights this in numerous reports and there
are some really good studies being done that point to a direct correlation between what they
describe in the UN charters as grand corruption and political and economic instability in
emerging markets.
I think that concept has moved on from some theory dreamt up by bright people
looking at it from an academic point of view in supra-national bodies like the UN. Now it’s
accepted and it has entered the general consciousness of at least the Western European and
North American population. I think there could be more political will to do something about
it; yes, legislation has been implemented but is totally ineffective in some cases; yes, a lot of
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companies talk a good game but don’t do much more than make polite statements about the
fact that they are trying to be compliant; but that is still a huge amount of progress from the
bad old days.
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Annex IV - Corporate needs in the Middle East
Interview with Yaser Dajani, Head of Middle Eastern Operations at Kroll Inc, Dubai
office, Nov 18, 2015

I: What is the role of corporate investigations in the Middle East? In England, the UKBA
requires a third party assess the risks of a company’s doing business with another. Compared
to this, what is the role of corporate investigators in the UAE?

Y.D.: Very little is done for compliance reasons. A lot of the work that we do in the Middle
East is for multinationals and we also work for indigenous clients. Let me break down our
clients a bit, just to put them in the proper context.
There are multinationals who are based in the Europe, the United States and a small
amount in Asia; those would be the primary regions. They are here because they would like
to explore different opportunities in the Middle East and they require us to help them
navigate various opportunities. So we’ve got that one particular basket and I’ll revisit it a
little later and break it down even more. This will give a broad picture of what Kroll Dubai
does.
We’ve also got international clients and multinational clients who are already based
here in the region and who are looking at transactions within the region, or they have certain
problems in the region. That’s the second basket.
The third basket is made up of indigenous clients who, in the same way as the second
basket of clients, they too are looking for business opportunities, and are therefore
considering transactions within the region, or to solve problems that they face within the
region.
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Then there’s a fourth basket made up of indigenous clients who are looking to enter a
new market outside this region.
So, let me take the first category, that being multinationals looking at opportunities
either inside the region or outside. They usually take one of two forms: (A) they want to
appoint a third party as a distributor or an agent or (B) they are looking to set up a joint
venture with a third party, that is with a local company. More often than not, the work that we
do for them is not driven by regulatory requirements, but rather it is driven by questions they
have in relation to commercial viability.
Don’t forget that there are usually three moving parts: there are advisors, who advise
on transactions; there are the lawyers; and there are the financial people to advise with
respect to acquisition and other M&A activities. Then there are people like us, who provide
intelligence on specific issues, when clients need to make informed decisions about the
viability of a particular project. A small percentage of clients, who are multinationals, and
who are not based on this region but who are looking to enter the market, do come to us for
compliance reasons - well, I wouldn’t actually call it compliance reasons, but when you put it
in that context, it could be; it’s a bit different in that they are asking: “is there anything about
this particular entity or group of individuals that I need to worry about from a compliance
point of view or from a regulatory point of view?”
This difference is that they are saying: “is the company or individual that I am
speaking to on any list that I need to be aware of?” There is a big difference between the past,
the present, and the future. These days, more and more clients are becoming so sophisticated
that they don’t need people like us, certainly not business intelligence or proper investigators
to answer those sorts of questions. They can do that on their own, internally, or they can hire
someone, and Kroll does that through the compliance team that we have. There are different

	
  

117	
  

	
  

checks at different levels of work that can be done to tell you whether there is anything out
there that occurred in the past that you need to be aware of.
We don’t really do that as our core business; it’s probably .001% of what we do. If
you look at most of our due diligence reports, at the end there’s half a page that tells a client
that we ran X’s name against hundreds of databases and nothing came up. Sometimes things
do come up, but that’s not really where the “juice” is, that’s not the work that we do. Our job
is to extract or identify information, as much as we can, based on its availability and our
ability to navigate the environment. Lots of people don’t understand that, as far as the
Middle East is concerned, there is no public record: you can’t go out and find information
about a company, or whether an individual has been involved in litigation that easily; the
public records here are not public and in fact the records don’t exist. When people refer to
“the public records in the Middle East” they don’t know what the talking about, because there
is no such thing. It’s the people who hold information in the Middle East, not the documents.
So our job is really to tell clients about the track record of third parties or
counterparties and about their reputation, so that it’s almost a blend of compliance and
advisory work. Because of geographic realities, a lot of the companies that are interested in
bribery, anti-corruption, money laundering and so on and so forth are not necessarily based in
this region and when they come to Kroll Dubai their questions are a lot more elaborate than
that. So that’s it for the first basket of multinationals looking to come into this region.
When we look at the second basket of multinationals who are looking at other parts of
the region or who have problems, it’s the same thing: don’t forget this office handles a fair
amount of due diligence projects and a fair amount of financial fraud investigation projects.
Take what I do for example: I do a lot of dispute advisory work and I do a lot of complex
business intelligence where I really get to the bottom of certain big gaps that clients need to
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fill in order to be able to inform their tactical maneuvering and strategy about dealing with
counterparties.
A lot of people in this region, when regulations like the FCPA and the UKBA come
up, look at these things as being incredibly US-centric. A lot of these local companies don’t
get it when an international company starts seeking disclosure from this potential third-party,
looking at the financials and the set-up, the relationships, the political connections, whether
they are a politically exposed person or not. They don’t understand that there are specific
requirements. This is particularly true for companies that rely on distribution channels that
they have limited control over, or when they enter into distribution agreements with third
parties; take the pharmaceutical companies for example, or those who sell household items or
any fast-moving distributable good such as tobacco: the way that they ensure market
distribution is by appointing third-party agents, and that’s where the risk really lies. That’s
what we really should be talking about in the Middle East: most of the multinationals cannot
have a presence in every country, so for example GlaxoSmithKline or Johnson & Johnson, or
these big names, rely on agents to make sure that the product reaches the market. Johnson &
Johnson or Mondelēz can’t set up a Kraft office in every city in the Middle East because it is
not viable, neither commercially or politically, nor from a security point of view. So the
Middle East sensitive 40s have been set up on the franchise or agency model, that represent
international brands, and international brands expect these agents to perform in the same
ethical way as those international brands.
If you take a look at all the bribery investigations that have taken place in the Middle
East, the reason why the US government has initiated regulatory action - in particular against
some of the international brands out there that has led to persecution, enforcement and
punishment penalties being imposed - is because of that model being the predominant
business model for the majority of the international brands.
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That’s really what the key focus is, it’s really a question of how do you ensure,
putting aside everything that I said about multinationals and indigenous clients, market entry
and due diligence. First, you’ve got to identify what the biggest exposure is, what are the
biggest gaps in the Middle East; and it’s that, it’s the appointment of agents.

I: What I’m investigating isn’t what checks are required by the law, but rather the checks that
the company runs because it has an interest to do so, whether they overlap or not with the
ones required by the law. When a foreign company seeks to invest in the Middle East, what
does it ask Kroll to check? What are the interests of this company?

Y.D.: They are all different: it depends on what the company wants, on the business model,
on the counterparty, on the jurisdiction, on the specific risks that they find as inherent in their
business relationship with that third-party, on the skill of operations, on the item or the
product or service that they want to sell.
Our work is not a commodity: a client comes to us and doesn’t say “can you give me
a check list of things I have to do?” My response would be exactly what I just told you, to ask
what they want to achieve, then we can talk about the specific areas that need to be
investigated. So, there is no “off-the-shelf” answer to your question.

I: How do these interests differ from those of a local company? And how do the local
companies seeking to expand abroad approach Western regulations if there is not such
culture, as you said?

Y.D.: It depends on the local company: if the local company is publicly listed, then obviously
their view of what the risks are, is going to be different. This will be different from the view
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of a private company looking to expand, or that of another private company in an industry
that is not high risk. So if a financial institution, or an investment bank, or a company that is
involved in pharmaceutical or insurance wanted to enter a new market, then obviously they
will have two things in mind:
(1) They will want to make sure that whatever they are doing doesn’t have any
regulatory implications, in relation to where they are from and where they want to do
business in. In these days everything is so interconnected; think of a financial institution here
and you have a correspondent banking relationship with a US bank: if it considers doing
business in sub-Saharan Africa, it will risk being exposed to Libya or Sudan and/or other
sanctioned entities; obviously this will influence the kind of checks that they would want to
run, to make sure that they are not exposed.
(2) They will take into consideration other areas, for example the reputational and
track record, when assessing a particular transaction.
So, again, my response to you is that it depends on what the nature of the company is,
and if is it publicly traded or not. There are no lists of questions that are “off-the-shelf” and
even if there were, that list will always change from one transaction to another.

I: Are checks related to security issues required at present? And to which purpose are they
usually required?

Y.D.: Yes, absolutely. We get these requests a lot, obviously. Of course if an American
company wants to set up a factory in Bangladesh, they are going to have concerns about the
issue of child labor.
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I: Are they going to have concerns? Why, if it is more convenient for a private company to
have children working on their t-shirts?

Y.D.: Because it violates are so many different rules and procedures. It violates the
company’s own corporate rules.

I: So they are coming to you for compliance checks, in a broad sense. Not because avoiding
security issues is ethical, but because the law requires it, right?

Y.D.: Everybody has targets, right. I don’t think a client comes to us because they are morally
obliged to spend $50,000 on due diligence. The kinds of questions clients ask us are always
driven by practical realities; investing in Iraq is not the same thing as investing in Dubai.
They are just two different realities.
True they are one region but clients will ask us about Kurdistan particularly if the
project in question is to buy equity in an oil and gas block; they’ll ask about the pipeline,
about Baghdad politics, about Kurdistan politics, about who’s in power in Erbil, if the
pipeline will ever be operational between Kurdistan and Turkey, what is the role of the
Barzani and of the Talabani.
The questions are going to be very different: there’s no cheat-sheet that you can pull
out of a drawer and say: “these are the questions that we need to ask”, because those
questions may not be relevant what they want to do. So the questions they ask in Dubai are
going to be different. When they come to invest in an oil and gas block in Abu Dhabi they
will probably not do anything. If they do, it they will probably do it with a very light touch,
because the risks are much lower than in Iraq.
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Therefore it is about two things: the level of risk in a particular place and the risk
appetite in a particular organization. There are organizations that have such a high risk
appetite that when they go to a place where the risk is low, we will never hear from them.
They will never come to us; they’ll do it on their own. That’s just the way it is.
If a company is operating in a high-risk region and their risk appetite is low,
particularly publicly traded companies from the US, they will come to us every day! But if
you have an international company that is privately owned, where the risk appetite in sort of
in the middle, and they are in a region that is of medium to high risk, they’ll come to us, but
they’ll probably spend very little money to get things done. It’s more of a tick-the-box sort of
exercise.
Now if you want to complicate things even more, let me add a third category, which is
the complexity of the transaction. If a company has a low risk-appetite, in a high-risk region,
for a very complex transaction it is going to spend a lot of time and money investigating
everything. So you could plot that on a graph and it would tell you exactly what clients are
doing globally. It’s about the appetite internally, it’s about the risk in the area where they are
and it’s about the complexity of the transaction. Nothing else, nothing more.

I: You said things are very different from country to country, and from region to region. In
your understanding, does a policy trend exist in the region, separating the Gulf policies from
the other Middle Eastern public policies? Do the checks run by the companies have a
geographical trend?

Y.D.: You are using a phrase that you should not be using, that is “the checks you run”. We
don’t do checks: we are advisers working with clients who are trying to identify operational
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risks. Operational risks are how the company is structured; corporate governance; problems
or disputes that we need to know about; financial positions.
As an example, if Boeing wants to appoint someone in Saudi Arabia and that
company claims to be providing maintenance services to the Saudi national airline, we might
go there and find out that they are only supplying oil to a company that provides maintenance
services to the Saudi national airline. Obviously something is wrong: it’s all about checking
the facts. Clients come to us and tell us what the transaction is, then it’s all about intelligence
gathering, so that when you go to the next meeting you know exactly what to say. There is no
check. There is no compliance.

I: What about the trends? You experienced the 2008 crisis and the public equity crisis: how
was before and how has this event impacted?

Y.D.: It revealed a lot of fraud, that’s what it did.

I: When?

Y.D.: Right after the financial crisis, in Dubai in particular. Dubai is what made the Gulf whether you like it or not, whether you believe it or not. Dubai started everything: without
Dubai the Gulf would not be where it is right now, because Dubai created momentum for
other nations; Qatar and Bahrain looked around and said “we are still living in the 15th
century, let’s do something about it”. If you go to Saudi Arabia, they still believe they are
living in the 15th century. People come to the Gulf because of Dubai. Because of that, all of a
sudden a lot of businesses started getting set up in Qatar and Bahrain. If you ask any expat,
who has the option of living in Dubai or Saudi Arabia or Qatar or Bahrain for a job, they are
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going to choose Dubai, it’s as simple as that. A lot of expats would not be in the Gulf if it had
not been for Dubai.
So Dubai was on a rollercoaster, and it was on cruise control pre-2008. Everyone was
making money, everything was great, and a lot of businesses were being set up here. Nobody
cared, nobody asked, at all. $1 million gets lost here, $5 million get stolen there, and nobody
cared. If you have $20 million in your pocket you won’t care if a $100 falls out. However if
that $20 million becomes $20 and you lose $100, you’re going to walk up and down the
street interrogating everybody that walked behind or who walked the same path, to find out
whether they took it.

I: Perhaps if you can elaborate on what the trends were in here in the UAE after the financial
crisis, then maybe we could predict what will happen after the European crisis.

Y.D.: They realized that you couldn’t do business with anybody without investigating them.
That risk-appetite I was telling you about earlier, if it was here (gesture) it went all the way
up to there (gesture), this was regardless of everything else whether they were complex or
straightforward transactions, high-risk jurisdiction or low-risk jurisdiction. This is
unchanged. Risk rose up and stayed there.

I: What is the relationship with law enforcement bodies and corporate investigations
companies here in the UAE?

Y.D.: We don’t have a relationship. We are a risk management company that is permitted to
provide various investigative services which we provide.
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I: But investigative services in many countries in the Middle East are illegal.

Y.D.: They are illegal in the UAE, but we are a free-zone company and everything we do is
within the confines of the law. We will not carry out any activities that would be considered
illegal. For example, take surveillance: it is something Kroll does in Europe, because, at least
in some jurisdictions in Europe, it is permitted. In the Gulf, and the UAE, it is not permitted,
so we don’t do it.

I: What if you find out about corrupt practices, together with your client. Are you legally
obliged to report it in the UAE?

Y.D.: If you witness a crime in the UAE, just as in any other Gulf country, you are legally
required to report it to the Authorities. Say, I am working on an investigation: 99.9% of the
time I’m talking about business intelligence, so external investigations, not internal
investigation. So, 99.9% of the time I don’t have a smoking gun. I did not see Antonio pay
so-and-so $50 million to win a contract. However, what I will be hearing is allegations,
rumors. Then I can put things in a proper context and I report that to my client, but I did not
witness a crime.

I: Do you think it is right, here and in this context that an investigator has to report his
findings to the police?

Y.D.: It’s not a simple yes or no answer. You have to take the circumstances into account:
what did you find? What has been discovered? You also have to understand that you have an
obligation to your client. I have to ask myself: “am I doing anything that violates my contract
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with my client by reporting it?” The flipside is that, by not reporting it, I might also be
violating my own internal rules on procedures and ethical conduct, or I could be also in
violation of local rules and laws and regulations. You have to look at it from multiple angles,
you can’t say: “I saw a crime in an investigation I’m working on, I must report it”, because
that’s the immediate reaction. You have to take a step back and look at it properly and
comprehensively.

I: Should a policy change happen at the government level about the involvement of agencies
like Kroll in the development of corporate monitoring mechanisms? The public sector often
falls behind on the understanding of business behavior, and the its interests collide with those
of companies.

Y.D.: That’s not necessarily true, it depends what government you’re talking about:
those who fall behind are probably just slow learners, but most governments are not behind.
It is not my job to engage in a public policy debate with the government about how they
should be improving their regulations, those that put me in a situation where I have to
cooperate with them and report things to them. I don’t work for the government, I work for
clients. Some of them are government clients but they don’t come to me for policy decisions.
So, the answer to your question is “no”.
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Annex V - The evolution of corporate investigations
Interview with Michael Olver, Managing Director at Pacific Strategies and Assessments,
November 24, 2015

I: What are the services offered by Pacific Strategies and Assessments (PSA)? How have
they evolved in the last years, and how has pre-deal intelligence evolved per se?

M.O.: We do risk advisory, litigation support, asset tracing and identification; this sort of
thing. A lot of our portfolio in Asia and the Middle East is also about international risk
management or fiscal risk.
If I understand your question correctly, you’d like to know what kind of innovative
things are going on right now: if you are looking for innovation in risk management, you
would probably look more towards Asia than the Middle East; it’s a much more mature
market in Asia. This happened since many former Hong Kong police employees started their
own risk management firms; the deal players also made it an interesting place for the US
regulators to take an interest in. Obviously China is very strong at the moment, and more and
more it is emerging as a kind of dominant regulator with a huge amount of throughput in
terms of deals that are being done. This has led to an ever-decreasing cost of services, and
huge innovation.
If you are looking at the industry as a whole, around 2000 a company like
IntegraScreen – now Thompson Reuters - came up with a new idea. To give that some
perspective: the Patriot Act came out in 2001, and there were a lot of FCPA-compliance
activities that were being carried out in an ad-hoc way: in-house counsel didn’t really know
what to do, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) wasn’t particularly responsive. Some were
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buying a $50,000 Kroll report claiming they did their due diligence; others were ordering a
$500 credit report and saying the same.
Integrascreen envisaged an intersection of technology with the reality of the FCPA: it
pulled out five or six highlights from the law – like political exposure and previous corrupt
practices – and built a mixed-technology platform that included source commentary and
record recovery; it managed to cover these bases and to sell the information for a much more
competitive price.
Also for banks, like for JP Morgan, Integrascreen provided a proprietary database
where it pulled in absolutely everything, sending out crawlers and sucking in information
from – say - the Indian Bureau of Customs, the Indian enforcement authorities, the FBI’s
most wanted lists, all of this stuff. As an example, here in Dubai it had somebody going
through every newspaper: when you lose your passport here, you have to make a public
announcement in the paper declaring the loss and the passport number, as part of the process
of filing a case to get a new passport from your embassy; Integrascreen manually pulled all
this information and put it into their database; at the end of three years of building it up, they
had one of the most incredible self-made databases that you could ever imagine. Checking for
hits against this database when closing a deal was some sort of movement towards
compliance, to check that one wasn’t doing business with Osama Bin Laden or a fraudster.
Once you bought into the database idea, the whole Internet searches, Google, Lexus
Nexus, and Factiva came in: they allowed to do much more than what could be done through
a bank of analysts sitting around phoning this information through. After building it into a
network of sources around the region, that could give a sort of source commentary. While
this revolution was happening the media had taken a dip, and there were many business
journalists out of work: companies started recruiting them and gaining physical presence in
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every country, and the information all came together in a really cheap and robust report that
was targeted towards that FCPA.
This process of evolution is still ongoing; companies like Nuri, for example, keep
innovating the industry today: they have a person that goes to the court every day and he
writes down everything in every court across the Middle East every day, because court
records aren’t public here, but the schedules are; he then takes this information and inputs it
into the database. He pulls any information that’s public on the registration of companies, and
puts that into the database.
In Integrascreen, they started with just a database, they added a process and then they
were sold for over $40 million; it was made of just two guys and a laptop when they joined
up and built that from scratch. What a fantastic trajectory on that! It was all about taking
existing technologies and just spinning it slightly, and then integrating it all in one place;
building it into a product and selling it.
So they hit every single one of the banks around Dubai, and they got most of those
bankers on board. As the owners of World Check bought them, they were able to integrate
the database into their records and bring it together; and now it’s all Thompson Reuters.
This process goes on further where they have local sources. A contractor who goes around
the Syrian markets asking about business information on people, all of a sudden realizes that
he can start his own company: over roughly a 15-year trajectory, companies that do local
records checks, source commentary and this sort of this have emerged in almost every
country in the world; they’re usually one or two-man bands that do this, but they’re all a part
of this global industry.
Anyway it’s all about growth and figuring out the markets and how things work:
many times a client of Integrascreen did not know what to do, so he would buy one report
from Integrascreen and one from the Corporate Research and Investigations Group (CRI), in
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order to have to reads on the same deal for less than $5,000; they could also claim they had
been duly diligent. CRI, though, was one of Integrascreen’s initial clients: there was an
awkward moment in the IntegraScreen-CRI relationship where CRI just re-bashed
IntegraScreen reports and sold them to the same client.

I: Could you expand on what we should expect in the future of this market?

M.O.: Within this trajectory, it’s all about accessibility. Now, data aggregators are emerging.
We (PSA, e.n.) have a global contract driven out of Asia with a US-based data aggregator
who is doing a really interesting thing: it has developed software that will do an automated
sweep of all public sorts of information and collate it all. While we would never give that
automated report directly to a client, it will be of support of our back-office in the
Philippines, full of English speakers. The software provides us with some information and we
do what we call an analysts’ review - the spin is that the solutions are automated. It’s just
machine time and your cost is for supporting this infrastructure plus our time for a chief
analyst in Manila, in order to do risk resolution, meaning the resolution of any sort of
identified flags. A flag might come up and it might say that someone is Osama Bin Laden; he
is part of the Arkaani network or he funded the junta in Myanmar: our analysts will look at it
and they will do additional public source reviews around each of these issues, in order to
exclude or confirm that piece of intel for $150 for the end-client. This service is as cheap as it
gets, for a very robust solution.
In 2009, Tom Everett-Heath gave me a very serious tongue lashing for basically
moving the bottom from the due diligence market; I think my response at the time was that it
was going to happen whether he liked it or not, because JP Morgan will do half a million
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deals worldwide a month and they can’t afford to carry the cost. Goldman Sachs was
spending $3 million a year with us.
There is always going to be this sort of navigation: a lot of the success of this kind of
companies has happened because they started as a technology company. Think of Red Flag:
terrible company, they could not find Dubai if they had to, but they developed a due diligence
program that loops into the SAP (Systems Applications and Products, e.n.) systems for
companies, so as a vendor comes on board and into the system, it automatically loops into the
due diligence process then loops back out again. This means that HSBC does not need a 40man compliance team led by Richard who’s ex-MI6 anymore; thanks to these systems they
can be compliant, with no additional pain or manpower: they are bringing their compliance in
house, without adding any human capital.
In the compliance industry a lot of people are working on different ways of speeding
up this process, reducing the cost while increasing the actual deliverables: the problem is not
how to do the best due diligence in the world, it’s how to do thousands of the best due
diligences in the world in a 30 day period, with the assets on hand and with the existing
technologies. We think we can do 70 to 80% within that sort of best frame and that is the
reality. Blue Umbrella, Red Flag, Kroll are in the United States, but about 50% of the really
innovative tech-driven companies that are doing this are all in Asia, because so many risk
management companies were founded, as I said. The dynamic were of super-Darwinian
competitiveness, plus then access to technologies, made it possible.

I: Let’s talk about the idea of culture. You said that it’s geographically relevant that Asia
bloomed a lot quicker. Why do you think that is?
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M.O.: Because for $650 in China one can pull registration records, get court records on 1+5
directors and produce a great analytical document that pulls in everything in the public
domain on a company in Chinese and English. If you try to do the same thing in Nigeria,
you’re out of luck. You are going to have to physically go down to the registry office. Same
goes for Mexico: it’s not even a federalized system, so you have to send somebody down to
Chihuahua to the registry there; they have to go talk to a guy; they have to show they have
due authority to receive this information; they get it; it takes ten days. I can do the same thing
in three days in China.
The ability to access information at speed and at cost is so much better in Asia than
anywhere else. There is an exception to the rule, in terms of Japan and Korea, where personal
privacy laws are so extensive that a lot of the information is databased but it’s not accessible:
one has to use workarounds to make sure to have the proper authority, that the individual
POA (power of attorney, e.n.) allows to go all the way through the system and the various
registries. These are already online, but they’re not going to tell you that they are publicly
accessible because of the privacy laws. On top of that, the market leader is doing really well
and has cornered the market.

I: Do you believe the public sector should capitalize on strengthening the public records’
system, or would it be a negative thing?

M.O.: If you look at Bahrain, it was business friendly right up until the time it wasn’t. They
were one of the first countries in the Middle East to put all of their company ownership
records online. This allows the process of due diligence to move faster, and this has a lot of
benefits.
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Being a closed environment can be very useful depending on your national position:
Panama makes its money from being the least accessible registry on the planet. Dubai’s
choice was to be open and business friendly, and made records available online for a long
time; something happened, probably post-2008, where there was a contraction. It used to be
that I could take 50 dirhams down to the Chamber of Commerce and I could call up the
corporate records for X, Y, and Z. That would tell me who the owners were; now the owners
are not public any more.

I: What’s better for PSA? Is it better to operate in a market that is full of competitors because
business is easy or is it better to be the only guy in Japan?

M.O.: That depends on the deal flow in Japan. There is a firm that buys Myanmar units:
they’re really smart guys, and they knew from day one that sanctions were going to be
dropped; they found partners, set up and started. That deal flow is not common and this
allowed them to be very successful. Strategically, as a business they positioned themselves
very well with a broad base over several different countries including Myanmar, but the
Myanmar unit is probably the Ferrari of Myanmar diligence, and they get one a month. It is
not expensive; it’s about $5000. They just haven’t really connected in a meaningful way.
I’m trying to remember who did it, but there have been a successive series of
businesses that say that if you did a sort of “blind taste-test”, hands down, corporations would
prefer to deal with stable autocratic regimes than with democracies. In part, that is because of
access to information: some may be open, some may not.
Try to do due diligence in Equatorial Guinea and you’ll find it difficult, but there’s
certainly an interest in doing it. If someone came to me and asked if I want to open an office
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in Myanmar, I would say “no” and I would just use a contractor there. I don’t have a business
argument to sustain an office in Myanmar so I’m going to decline.

I: Under what “label” do you operate in Manila and the rest of Asia/Middle East? Do you
describe yourself as an investigative firm, a strategist or an investment risk management
firm?

M.O.: Our structures are a little bit strange: in Manila we are the last man standing. CRI is no
longer visible there; Colin Hill & Associates are no longer there; most of the multinationals
with advisory offices have all closed down. The profit margins were just sinking and it was
very hard to make a profitable argument: it all comes down to energy. If I, as a CEO of a
multinational investigatory corporation, can spend a day of my week managing stuff that’s
going on the Philippines or I can spend a day of my week managing stuff that’s going on in
London, I’m going to choose London. That’s because we’re going to make more out of every
single investigation of due diligence there than I am in the Philippines. In general there is a
rule that the further away you are from where your clients are making decisions, the less
money you make off them. For Manila, we do investigations, risk management, crisis
management, and we do the actual physical security assessments as well as VIP protection.
It’s just because we started in the Philippines in 2000 and we started on the back of a very
strong relationship, so that emerged as a viable business opportunity.
In China, given the contraction that happened within the investigation space in 2011,
we are solely a due diligence corporate advisory firm. There is no security; it’s all in-house
investigations and there’s nothing outside of that box, because from a risk management
perspective we have to be very, very careful: it’s a very strong government and they are very
actively monitoring diligence companies.

	
  

135	
  

	
  

I: Is it always a viable option to label a corporate investigations company as “risk
management firm” to shelter it from the legal limitations of certain business sectors? Can you
comment on the UAE regulation?

M.O.: We do corporate investigations and risk management. If you look at the business
licenses of each of the entities that are active, they all have a line of business investigations. It
does get a little tough in this market, because since 2003 it has been illegal to be an
investigation firm in the United Arab Emirates. In the business investigation area, Dubai has
got to be one of the only places in the Middle East where it is an actual business line.

I: What are the risks when choosing how to position a corporate investigations firm in the
market? As an investigative firm you might have an obligation to disclose your client’s
criminal offences or corruption. Do you believe that it is the role of a company that does risk
management to pass on information, even if there isn’t an obligation?

M.O.: It all goes back to control. Most times, in complex investigations, we are asked to do a
thorough third-party investigation into what has happened somewhere, because based on this
the client will go to the regulators at home and disclose wrong practices, or we are asked to
disclose the information directly. If I just pick up the phone and call the police, at that
moment I lose complete control of where this investigation is going to go; what information
is going to be uncovered. I want them to look at this, but as in-house counsel I am the last
person to know. The police may come in and get distracted by something “shiny” and focus
its investigative efforts somewhere else: I have no control anymore; I can’t stop it or turn it
off.
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So part of the reason why we are engaged as a third party is to go in and do a robust
investigation as if we were the regulator. Because I, with my crisis team and in-house
counsel, want to be able to spot what the regulators are going to find if they search, so the
client can get a legal opinion. It’s all part of the bargaining position before you can take that,
bundle it all up, find your scapegoat, do all the wonderful things the client has to do, and only
then hand it across to make use of the fine reduction scheme. When dealing with the DOJ, the
fines are dramatically reduced for early disclose or any wrongdoing.
Most times clients go to a corporate investigations company because it has all the
experience of the police, or of the FBI. This is why the brand “FBI” and the brand “SOCA”
sell so well when included in a private company: these former agents are brought in by the
client and dealt with as if they were wearing their old hat.
In terms of information sharing, I have only had one significant case in the last ten
years where I’ve had a client who tasked us with taking the information and pass it on to the
government Authorities because they saw it as a corporate obligation. We did: we went down
for a coffee, for a chat, I gave them my file, and they made their decisions to pursue and
prosecute based on the information that they then collected.
As concerns computer forensics, here in the UAE, it was seen with a lot of distrust in
the beginning and then it became more accepted. It is possible to run a computer forensics
case, from which it is possible to find something illegal; if the client wants to make it
criminal he will take the uncorrupted original laptop, a copy of the report which highlights
the things that were found, and he will give it to the police who will run its own forensic
analysis. What Kroll does, like a lot of other companies, is that it will go to the police and
have themselves listed as a court recognized expert; that short-circuits the process a bit. For
those cases where you’re being brought in to look at something, if you don’t have lawyers
registered in that particular jurisdiction, your first reaction is usually to position yourself so
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that there is attorney-client privilege governing the action: the client will say “please stop
talking to me right now; here’s a list, engage these firms and have them engage us and come
into the room with us. Copy them on the emails and then we can talk about this, but right now
I do want to know about it as I could be subpoenaed; I could be requested to give testimony. I
have no privilege that I can offer you.”
In a lot of the conversations that I have with the police here, they are very distrustful:
they see that you’re getting paid for something; they know that you are in their office with
something; they want to know what your angle is, and why you are trying to bring pain on
this guy? Before they open the case, and before they spin your files up to the prosecutor and
he spends a lot of time and money - and it is only a very small crew here in Dubai – they
want to understand what you are trying to accomplish.

I: There is a sort of special oversight for security matters. For the bribes a company might
check twice, but for child labor they might check once and just ask quietly. How present are
security-related investigations in your line of work?

M.O.: You need to think where your authority as a firm derives from: in most cases it is
derived from the company that is engaging you and who’s checking out their vendor; the
client wants to ensure there are good working conditions, basic fire safety and no child labor
and they engage you as a third-party in order to this, and they grant you the authority,
because in their engagement with the vendor they have a right to audit for this. This, for
example, feeds into the debate that is ongoing now about private military contractors. There
is a role for the private sector in an indirect manner in enforcing relations, but it’s the
adoption and the access to that ability that is the key: that’s why I was talking about moving
things in the database and such. It’s when that became accessible, that it became more
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effective. Because companies themselves would like to be profit centers: people are in
companies and they don’t want to lose money. They need an accessible solution to be able to
apply the law, which is where an innovative and strong private sector in this area does really
well. I think there is certainly room for the private sector to take on an investigative and a
support role for this legislation, but it’s all about price points and control. It’s all about their
internal risk management structure coming into play.

I: When does it become convenient for a company to do an enhanced level of checking on a
potential partner, or to make a decision to move away from that partner?

M.O.: When that becomes economically accessible: that is, at the nexus of regulation
enforcement and the cost of the service. Everybody makes balance of risks judgments all the
time. If we are looking at it from a regulatory standpoint, enforcement in Italy is somewhat
patchy: those who engage in corrupt business practices usually don’t go to jail; there is not
sort of sword of Damocles that hangs over them every time they do business elsewhere,
which is why there are a certain number of Italian companies that are active in Saudi and in
areas where corruption is present, that seem to do very well. I’m not saying there’s a causal
relationship. However, in the United States for a similar company it’s different because they
have that sword of Damocles hanging over their head, which is, if we pay a bribe to the
Deputy Minister of Oil in order to be allowed onto the contracts’ list and we receive this
contract and it ever come out, the US DOJ will be in my face so quickly that I will not have a
company by Wednesday.
Therefore I look at the potential gain from this, the potential cost of the bribe, the
potential gain of the contract. I look at my global operations I look at my reputation, and most
people will just intuitively ascribe a dollar value to all of the stuff. They’ll take a look at this
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risk and they’ll say “how many other US companies that pay bribes in Saudi Arabia have
been picked up by the DOJ and are under active prosecution? I know these and what they
were doing looks a lot like what I’m about to try to do. I can’t do it.” They make an internal
assessment of the risks.
The way it works around here, instead, is that the vendor comes back and says “I
understand you’re a US company, you can’t pay me directly, but my cousin owns a company
over here, and if the contract comes through, we would like you to tie us up exclusively. My
fencing company will do this fencing contract at a dramatically inflated price, then the
company will show that it has been due diligent, because it did an appropriate level of due
diligence, as required by US law, on the fencing company.
I guarantee that if the US enforcement agencies began picking on US companies
active in Iraq, all of a sudden that threshold of risk would reduce and you would see an
increase in the amount of real meaningful due diligence done. Not just a $750 World Check,
it would be your $35-$45,000 Kroll report, which is where you really need to be to get good
information.

I: So you’re telling me yes, it is acceptable for the government to ask for more checks from a
company because economically it is acceptable, but how can you incentivize that?

M.O.: You don’t; the key comes with enforcement. If the DOJ opened an office in Baghdad
and actively investigated things that were happening in Iraq with US companies, all of a
sudden most companies in Iraq would close. It is such a corrupt environment it is not possible
to carry on. It is not so much the accessibility of the due diligence, it’s the enforcement. It is
possible to see this within companies that have been the recipients of large fines: the budget
moves towards due diligence; that goes up, and it will stay up for a while; then it will be
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lessened again as people start looking at budgetary concerns. Finally it will go back to a
status of whatever acceptable risk is.
Due diligence could be incentivized in different ways, for example with tax breaks for
the due diligence expenditure or the regulatory internal compliance expenditure. However,
incentives really come from not being the subject of enforcement; in areas that have weak
domestic or external enforcement a lot of people will take that risk.

I: Do you believe that FCPA/UKBA-modeled regulations could work in the Middle East or
does this region need something different, particularly in sight of the extremely different
political situations?

M.O.: It would be very difficult, and it should be done over time. Most things are personalitydriven here: there would be the need for a preliminary notice about the fact that such anticorruption and bribery policy will be enforced over a five-year period. This would allow the
businesses, the transactional environment, to adapt. Dubai has done very well with that in
2008 and 2009: now it is seen as less acceptable to request a bribe or to pay a bribe because
there is a potential for enforcement to happen; but certainly for other fraud or other
corruption risks, I’d put the UAE in the same basket as the other Gulf States, where they are
not perceived as such a negative thing, and the law is unevenly enforced.
There is a culture of corruption. In India, for example, you wouldn’t be able to
transact without it: many professionals with big MBAs who returned to India, unless they had
an uncle or an extended family that could sit them down and explain the system, they got
owned. And it is the same thing in Lebanon: I ran a business there for two years and as soon
as I started making money you would be amazed how many people came by saying “I
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represent this front and this interest or whatever, and I see you are making some money, so
who does your protection? It’s a dangerous place, Lebanon”.

I: Are Middle Eastern companies more concerned with security-related issues for cultural
reasons or for practical-economic reasons?

M.O.: If they guys of Horreya in Cairo somehow ended up on the list of financiers for the
Muslim Brotherhood, they would not be open tomorrow: they would be going go to jail
forever and ever. There is a post-September 11 fear. There was a massive crack down on
charities, which means that if you want to give money here now, it has to go to the Emirates
Red Crescent office first. It’s not so much a cultural desire: there still is a personal interest, in
a large group of people, in financing groups that are either outright or near to terrorist groups.
I certainly think among the Christian population in Egypt. You are going to find probably one
or two Copts in the entire country who are not going to care about funding the Muslim
Brotherhood or anybody who is associated with ISIS or organizations like that. Everybody
else is scared to death, they don’t want their money for personal reasons, but it’s not
necessarily as widespread as that.
Then, it’s also a matter of weighing the ability to do your business or going to jail.
Under the Patriot Act, if you fund terrorism, your ability to do transactions in US dollars as a
bank drops. The central banks started looking at it and tried to figure out ways to avoid
terrorist financing or at least to cut off some of the risk. Standard Chartered shut down its
SMEs bracket here two years ago. They shut down 800 businesses; they were bankrupt.
HSBC has done the same thing. They didn’t wake up one morning and say “we are really
good people we’re going stop this”. Well, maybe they are good people. They stopped because
they faced significant fines for terrorist financing and went through remediation. They are
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shedding different business lines to make that happen, but largely on the back of the
enforcement issue.
It is still about the certainty of the law. What the private sector can do is assist in
identifying risks and helping you mitigate them but they can’t take a role as either a regulator
or an enforcer above this, because they are extra-State. In terms of what the private sector can
do is to move that ball forward in a passive context: imagine if the DOJ put out a bid for five
local investigations companies to take on one of its cases in exchange for recovery fees and a
percentage of everything clawed back. I guarantee you would find four or five companies
willing to do that, and then the enforcement side would get dramatically better.
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